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PRIMARY APPEAL 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Plaintiff/appellant Melany Zoumadakis appeals from (i) the jury verdict in favor of 
defendant, appellant and cross-appellee Dr. Mark Mason ("Mason") on the one allegedly 
defamatory statement that survived summary judgment; and (ii) the district court's grant 
of summary judgment on Zoumadakis' defamation claim in favor of defendants and 
appellants Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc. ("Uintah Basin"), Dr. Mason, Carolyn 
Smith ("Smith") and Lloyd Neilsen ("Neilsen") (collectively "Appellees"), except with 
respect to one alleged statement by Dr. Mason. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-4-103(2)(j) and Utah R. 
App. Proc. 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Mason was error. The standard 
of review applied to challenges to jury verdicts based on insufficiency of the evidence is 
whether there was substantial evidence to support the verdict. When considering an 
insufficiency challenge, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most 
supportive of the verdict, and assumes that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence 
which sustain its findings and judgment. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 
461, 467 (Utah 1996). If the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the verdict 
supports the verdict, the appellate court will affirm. Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 
875 (Utah 1995). 
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2. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on 
Zoumadakis' defamation claim except with respect to one alleged statement by Dr. 
Mason. Summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correctness, with no deference 
accorded the district court. Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, ^8, 171 P.3d 
442. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action, which is now on appeal for the second time, arose out of Zoumadakis' 
employment with Uintah Basin as a home health nurse and the termination of her 
employment in September 2003. Zoumadakis filed her Complaint in December 2003, 
alleging claims of defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and interference 
with contract. District Court Record ("R. ") at 1-8. In January 2004, appellees moved 
to dismiss Zoumadakis' Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice. R. 31-32. On May 24, 
2004, the Court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss, which order Zoumadakis 
appealed. R. 97-99. On appeal, this Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of 
Zoumadakis' intentional infliction and interference with contract claims. Zoumadakis v. 
Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc., et al.t 2005 UT App. 325, H17-11, 122 P.3d 891. 
However, this Court reversed the district court's dismissal of the defamation claim, 
holding that Zoumadakis had stated a claim for defamation. Id. at 1fl[l-5. 
Following remand, the parties conducted discovery, after which appellees moved 
for summary judgment on all facets of Zoumadakis' defamation claim. R. 175-77. The 
district court granted summary judgment to all parties except with respect to one alleged 
2 
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statement by Dr. Mason. R. 440-48. On September 6 and 7, 2007, trial was held on the 
one remaining element of Zoumadakis' defamation claim against Dr. Mason. On 
September 7, 2007, the jury returned a verdict finding no cause of action against Dr. 
Mason. R. 581-83. On December 17, 2007, the district court entered a final judgment 
dismissing Zoumadakis' claim with prejudice. R. 618. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Uintah Basin is a hospital and medical system located in Roosevelt, Utah. 
R. 1; 129. 
2. Zoumadakis was employed by Uintah Basin from approximately June 1990 
through mid-September 2003. R. 2; 3. During periods relevant to her claim, Zoumadakis 
worked for Uintah Basin's Home Health Division. R. 213. 
3. Dr. Mason is a board certified orthopedic surgeon practicing in Roosevelt, 
Utah. Pursuant to a contract between Dr. Mason and Uintah Basin, Dr. Mason provides 
medical services at Uintah Basin's outpatient clinic and has medical and surgical 
privileges in its medical facilities. R. 660 at 210-12. 
4. As part of her employment with Uintah Basin, Zoumadakis occasionally 
provided home health care services to Dr. Mason's patients pursuant to medical orders 
from Dr. Mason. R. 660 at 215. 
5. Appellee Smith is Dr. Mason's clinic nurse. R. 660 at 167. 
6. Appellee Neilsen is director of Uintah Basin's Home Health Division. R. 
660 at 107. 
3 
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7. In September 2003, Smith received a call from Zoumadakis regarding one 
of Dr. Mason's patients for whom Zoumadakis was providing home health care. R. 660 
at 168. The patient involved was a diabetic and presented difficult wound care issues. 
Id at 170-71. 
8. Zoumadakis told Smith that she was at the patient's home, and she thought 
the medical treatment prescribed by Dr. Mason was wrong. Dr. Mason was standing by 
Smith's desk, and Smith therefore told Zoumadakis that she could talk to Dr. Mason 
directly and handed the telephone to Dr. Mason. R. 660 at 168. However, when Dr. 
Mason said hello, Zoumadakis was no longer on the line. Id. at 170-71. 
9. Because Zoumadakis was no longer on the line, Dr. Mason called his 
patient. The patient was upset and told Dr. Mason that Zoumadakis had said the 
treatment Dr. Mason had prescribed was wrong and inappropriate. R. 660 at 216-217. 
10. Dr. Mason's office scheduled the patient to come in a day or two later. 
When the patient came in, both she and her spouse were still upset and, based on their 
conversation with Zoumadakis, were concerned that Dr. Mason had not prescribed the 
right treatment. Dr. Mason spent approximately an hour with the patient and her spouse 
in order to calm them down and relieve their fears. Id. at 217-218. 
11. On several previous occasions, patients had reported to Dr. Mason that 
Zoumadakis told them that Dr. Mason's prescribed treatment was wrong, upsetting the 
patient and creating concern over their treatment. Id. at 218-219. 
#248533 vl sic 
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12. Dr. Mason was concerned about Zoumadakis' conduct with his patient for 
several reasons, in* ludiitp fhril 'oumadakis' comments upset his patient potentially 
interfered with the healing process and patient compliance, and negatively impacted the 
trust relationship between Dr. Mason and his patient. R. 660 at 205-06; 214-18. Dr 
Mason was also very concerned *n ui dial Ihis type of iru ideitl h id hapj H IH d In fun \ illi 
Zoumadakis. Id. at 218-19. 
13. Given his concerns, Dr. Mason called Uintah Basin to report what had 
happened and his concern over Zoumadakis' actions U 660 at 21 w I )i » lason spoke 
with Vicky Holzman, assistant administrator over Quality at Uintah Basin, Neilsen, who 
was head of Uintah Basin's Home Health Division, and ultimately, Carlene Jensen, 
Director of Nursing. Id at 197-98; 220-21. 
14. Dr. Mason told Uintah Basin that a patient had reported that Zoumadakis 
had questioned his treatment, upsetting the patient R 660 at 198 Because of his 
concerns and previous similar experiences with Zoumadakis, Dr. Mason also told Uintah 
Basin that in the future he did not want Zoumadakis assigned to visit his patients. Id. at 
221-22. 
15. Uintah Basin's Home Health Division had enough patients that assigning 
Zoumadakis to patients other than those being treated by Dr. Mason was not a problem. 
R. 660 at 132-33. For example, during 2003, while Dr. Mason referred more patients to 
Uintah Basin's Home Health Division than any other single physician, of the 190 Home 
#248533 vl sic 
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Health patients Uintah Basin saw during that period, only 26 were referred by Dr. Mason. 
Id. at 128; 133. 
16. Following Dr. Mason's initial conversations with Uintah Basin regarding 
Zoumadakis, a patient also reported to Dr. Mason that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol 
during a patient visit. R. 233-35; 247-48. Dr. Mason forwarded this complaint to Uintah 
Basin. 7c/.;R. 661 at 142. 
17. Neilsen verbally discussed with Zoumadakis Dr. Mason's concerns over 
Zoumadakis' statement to his patient regarding Dr. Mason's treatment and the patient 
complaint that she smelled of alcohol. He also prepared a corrective discipline report 
documenting Dr. Mason's and the patient's complaints. R. 660 at 113-14; 144-48; R. 661 
at 46-60. 
18. Dr. Mason was not involved in any way in Uintah Basin's decision 
regarding what discipline, if any, to impose on Zoumadakis, nor did he request that any 
action be taken with respect to Zoumadakis, other than that she no longer see his patients. 
R. 660 at 132-33; 144; 221-22. 
19. The written warning Zoumadakis received imposed certain conditions on 
her employment, including being subject to drug testing upon request from Uintah Basin. 
R. 660 at 196-97. Lloyd Neilsen met with Zoumadakis to discuss the warning. 
Zoumadakis objected to the conditions, in particular, to the drug testing requirement. R. 
660 at 151-52. 
#248533 vl sic 
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20. When Neilsen told Zoumadakis she must sign the written warning 
acknowledging acceptance of the conditions in older to rtinain i mployed • fit stood up, 
said that in that case she did not have a job, and left the meeting and Uintah Basin's 
premises. Her employment with Uintah Basin therefore terminated. R. 660 at 113-14; 
151-52. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Zoumadakis challenges the jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Mason on the grounds it 
is not supported by the evidence Contrary to Zoumadakis' assertions, the verdict must 
be affirmed for multiple reasons. First, Zoumadakis fails to meet her burden of 
marshalling all evidence in support of the verdict and explaining why such evidence is 
insufficient. Moreover, the jury's verdict is in fact suppoitrd In .ttbstantial evident e 
Finally, the verdict may also be affirmed on alternate grounds. The evidence submitted at 
trial established only that the gist of what Dr. Mason told Uintah Basin about 
Zoumadakis was that she had I ild In > patient that (he treatment I >i Mason prescribed was 
wrong. Dr. Mason testified that his patient in fact reported to him that Zoumadakis had 
questioned his treatment for the patient. Therefore, his statement to Uintah Basin was 
tine precluding liability for defamatikui In iddition, inv slate mint In 1 >i Mason li 
Uintah Basin regarding Zoumadakis' care of and interaction with their mutual patients 
was subject to a qualified privilege. Zoumadakis failed to produce evidence of malice at 
trial sufficient to negate the qualified privilege, precluding liabilils on I >r Mason's pari 
#248533 vl sic 
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Zoumadakis also challenges the grant of summary judgment in appellees' favor, 
but the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellees.1 Summary 
judgment must be affirmed with respect to Dr. Mason's statement to Uintah Basin that a 
patient complained that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol during a patient visit because the 
undisputed evidence established the statement was true. The district court correctly 
granted summary judgment with respect to Carolyn Smith's, Dr. Mason's nurse, alleged 
statement to Dr. Mason that Zoumadakis had questioned his treatment because 
Zoumadakis failed to produce any evidence regarding what was said and because any 
statements would be subject to a qualified privilege. 
Summary judgment must be affirmed with respect to the disciplinary report 
Neilsen prepared addressing Dr. Mason's complaint and the patient's complaint 
regarding alcohol because the report was never published outside of Uintah Basin 
management, and because the report was true, i.e., complaints were received. Summary 
judgment should be affirmed with respect to Uintah Basin's alleged statement to the Utah 
Department of Employment Security because the alleged statement was not defamatory 
and because such publications are privileged. Summary judgment should be affirmed 
with respect to Carlene Jensen's alleged statement regarding Zoumadakis to Chris 
Dalsing because such statement was subject to a qualified privilege. Summary judgment 
must be affirmed with respect to alleged statements by unidentified Uintah Basin 
1
 The district court's only error was not granting summary judgment on 
Zoumadakis' defamation claim in its entirety, as set forth in Dr. Mason's conditional 
cross-appeal at 32-34 below. 
8 
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employees regarding Zoumadakis because Zoumadakis failed to demonstrate any basis 
on which 1 htitalt Idisni lould l»r hrM Habit ttti such st.tfetiiails Hthtlh .iiiiiitiaiy 
judgment must be affirmed with respect to an alleged statement by Juanita Thacker, a 
Home Health Supervisor, to Linda Cook, a manager in the Home Health Division, 
because such statement was subject to a qualified privilege. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JURY'S VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DR. MASON SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED 
At trial, Zoumadakis alleged that Dr. Mason had defamed her by telling Uintah 
Basin that she was practicing medicine without a license. Zoumadakis claims that the 
jury verdict in I )r Mason's favor on her claim must be reversed because il il m I 
supported by sufficient evidence. To the contrary, the verdict is supported by ample 
evidence and must be affirmed. 
A. The Jury Correctly Found That Dr. Mason Did Not Publish A 
Statement that Zoumadakis Was Practicing Medicine Without a 
License 
In seeking to reverse the jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Mason, Zoumadakis must 
iirst marshal all of the evidence supporting the jury verdict and then demonstrate why 
such evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108, 
f 19, 57 I' hi 1 (N i This burden requires Zoumadakis to "marshal 'every scrap' of 
"\ 
Prior to trial, Zoumadakis characterized Dr. Mason's statement both as 
Zoumadakis "was practicing medicine without a license" and that she had questioned his 
care with a patient. In presenting her case to the jury, however, Zoumadakis asserted that 
Dr. Mason's alleged defamatory statement was that she was "practicing medicine without 
a license." R.660 at 198; 661 at 184-85; see also, Opening Brief at 8. 
9 
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evidence that supports the jury's finding" and also that she "assume the role of'devil's 
advocate.'" Id. Here, while Zoumadakis points to some evidence supporting the verdict, 
she does not marshal all of the evidence, and more importantly, fails to present any 
argument regarding why such evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Instead, she 
simply points to evidence she believes supports her claim, in effect recreating the factual 
case she presented to the jury. Because Zoumadakis has failed to embrace fully her 
burden of marshaling the evidence, this Court should deny her appeal without further 
analysis and affirm the verdict. See id. (If the party challenging the verdict fails to meet 
its marshaling obligation, we will presume that the evidence supported the verdict); 
Water Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, ^15, 48 P.3d 888, (where a party fails 
to meet its marshaling burden, the appellate court will not disturb the verdict). 
In fact, the evidence at trial is more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict in 
favor of Dr. Mason. Pointing to trial exhibit 3, a document created by Vicky Holzman, 
Uintah Basin's Assistant Administrator of Quality, that characterized Dr. Mason's 
complaint as one that Zoumadakis is "practicing medicine without a license," 
Zoumadakis claims it is "unrefutable" that Dr. Mason uttered those words. Opening 
Brief at 20. Zoumadakis did not call Holzman as a witness at trial to address the form, 
and that Holzman used those words in Exhibit 3 to describe Dr. Mason's complaint does 
#248533 vl sic 
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not establish that Dr. Mason made such a statement. The phrase may have been 
Moreover, as Zoumadakis admits, other evidence supported the jury's finding that 
Dr. Mason did not state that Zoumadakis was practicing medicine without a license. Dr 
Mason testified, that his complaii it to I lii itah Basil i was that Zoi 11 i ladakis had told a 
patient that Dr. Mason's prescribed treatment was incorrect or inappropriate, and that he 
did not recall using the words "practicing medicine without a license" about Zoumadakis. 
R. 660 at 198.4 Similarly. 1 * . Nielsen, Zoumadakis' supervisor and an ltl IOI of the 
corrective discipline report, testified that he could not remember the exact words Dr. 
Mason used, but the gist of the complaint was that Zoumadakis went into a patient's 
home and questioned his orders as a physician, R 660 at 1 Zoumadakis suggests 
that Nielsen later testified that Dr. Mason said "practicing medicine without a license," 
but again, the testimony to which she cites responded to questions in which Zoumadakis' 
counsel characterized Dr. Mason's words in that manner R 660 at 110 When 
In an affidavit presented to the district court at summary judgment, Holzman 
testified only that Mason told her that a patient had told him that Zoumadakis questioned 
Dr. Mason's treatment. R. 251. 
4
 Zoumadakis acknowledges Dr. Mason's testimony but then suggests that in late i 
testimony, he acknowledged making the statement. Opening Brief at 21. A careful 
review of Dr. Mason's testimony, however, demonstrates that he did not acknowledge 
saying Zoumadakis "was practicing medicine without a license." Rather, in the first 
instance, after stating that he did not believe he used those words, Dr. Mason said the 
phrase was a "common colloquialism" used to describe people practicing outside the 
purview of their license, but affirmed he did not recall using those specific words. Id. 
198-99. In the second instance, Dr. Mason responded to a question from Zoumadakis' 
counsel that characterized his statement as "practicing medicine without a license;" he 
did not acknowledge having used those words. R. 660 at 205-206. 
#248533 vl sic 
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asked specifically what Dr. Mason said, Neilsen stated several times he did not recall the 
exact words Dr. Mason used, but that he was complaining that Zoumadakis questioned 
his orders. R. 660 at 109-11L Finally, Carlene Jensen testified that she did not recall Dr. 
Mason using the words "practicing medicine without a license." R. 661 at 138. 
On appeal, the jury's verdict should be sustained if there is any substantial 
evidence to support it. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81,1^96-98, 130 P.3d 325. 
Moreover, in reviewing the evidence, "[w]here evidence may be susceptible to multiple 
interpretations, some tending to support the verdict, others pointing to an ill-advised 
result," this Court should indulge only those reasonable inferences favorable to the 
verdict. Id; see also, Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991) 
("When the testimony of witnesses is in conflict, we accept that testimony which supports 
the jury's verdict, unless it is inherently implausible, and ignore the evidence which does 
not support the verdict, even if we might think it more convincing"). Ample evidence 
supported the jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Mason and it must be sustained. 
B. The Jury Verdict Can Be Sustained on Multiple Other Grounds 
In addition, a jury's verdict should be affirmed if other independent grounds exist 
which support the verdict. Water Energy, 2002 UT 32 at [^16 n.3. ("We further note that 
. . . the jury's finding in favor of [appellee] on the company's claim for intentional 
interference with business relations would constitute independent grounds for affirmance. 
. . ."); see also Hodges, 811 P.2d at 164-165 (verdict may be sustained where it was 
appropriate on at least one cause of action submitted to the jury). Here, the verdict may 
#248533 vl sic 
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also be sustained because (i) the statement made by Dr. Mason was true, and (ii) any 
statements between Dr. Mason and Uintah Basin are subject to a qualified privilege. 
As outlined above, the evidence demonstrated that Dr. Mason told Uintah Basin 
that a patient reported that Zoumadakis questioned the treatment Dr. Mason had 
prescribed. At trial, Dr. Mason testified that his patient in fact reported to him both on 
the phone and in person that Zoumadakis told the patient the treatment Dr. Mason 
prescribed was wrong or not correct. R. 660 at 198; 216-218. While Zoumadakis 
testified she did not question Dr. Mason's treatment, that testimony does not directly 
refute that Dr. Mason received such a report from the patient. Dr. Mason's testimony 
regarding his patient's statement is more than adequate to support a finding that Dr. 
Mason's statement was true, and the jury verdict may be sustained on that ground. 
In addition, the jury's verdict must also be affirmed because Dr. Mason's alleged 
statement was subject to a qualified privilege. The trial court found that statements 
between Dr. Mason and Uintah Basin regarding their common patients were protected by 
a qualified privilege and instructed the jury regarding the same. R. 575.5 Under Utah 
law, the malice required to overcome a qualified privilege requires evidence of ill will, 
5
 Although Zoumadakis did not dispute the qualified privilege at summary 
judgment, R. 272, she now suggests that the trial court erred in finding a qualified 
privilege. Opening Brief at 25. However, Zoumadakis failed to preserve an objection to 
the district court's instruction and she therefore cannot challenge that instruction on 
appeal. Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129 1J8, 63 P.3d 686, ("The rules 
of civil procedure require a party to preserve an objection to a jury instruction for appeal 
absent special circumstances; unless a 'party objects to an instruction or the failure to 
give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a 
manifest injustice.'") (internal citations omitted). 
13 
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excessive publication or that the defendant did not reasonably believe his statements. 
Russell v. Thomson Newpapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 904-05 (Utah 1992). Contrary to her 
arguments, Zoumadakis failed to adduce evidence of malice. 
Zoumadakis asserts that Dr. Mason's request that Zoumadakis no longer see his 
patients and statement that he would refer his patients elsewhere for home health if she 
continued to see his patients is evidence of ill will, constituting malice. However, on its 
face this statement does not evidence malice - it is a request for action and does not 
directly address the motivation behind the request. Moreover, given the specific evidence 
presented by Dr. Mason regarding his motivation, the request does not give rise to any 
inference of ill will or malice. 
Dr. Mason testified that his request did not come from personal animosity but 
from legitimate reasons related to the patient's treatment. R. 660 at 205-06; 214-18. The 
patient was upset and concerned by Zoumadakis' statement, and Dr. Mason testified that 
it took almost an hour to calm down the patient. Dr. Mason testified that the patient had a 
difficult case and he was very concerned that Zoumadakis' comments could cause the 
patient not to follow her treatment. R. 660 at 205-06. Dr. Mason indicated that stress can 
also interfere with healing. Id Dr. Mason testified his concerns were magnified because 
he had received previous reports from patients that Zoumadakis had questioned his care, 
resulting in distress and concern on the part of the patients. R. 660 at 218-19. He 
testified that while he was able to speak with this particular patient and intervene, he was 
concerned that other patients might hear similar comments from Zoumadakis that he did 
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not know about, and those patients might stop following his orders, impeding their 
progress. Id. at 205. Finally, Dr. Mason testified he asked for Zoumadakis to be 
reassigned from his patients because the incidents with Zoumadakis were negatively 
impacting his relationship with his patients and potentially jeopardizing patient care. Id. 
at 220-21. 
Dr. Mason's legitimate concerns regarding the effect of Zoumadakis' statements 
to his patient were corroborated by other witnesses. R. 660 at 143 (trust between a doctor 
and patient is important to the healing process); R. 661 at 130-31 (a good trust 
relationship between doctor and patient is necessary to the healing process). Zoumadakis 
provided absolutely no evidence - other than the fact of the request — to counter Dr. 
Mason's evidence of the legitimate and non-malicious motivation behind his request. 
Given this direct and specific evidence, no inference of malice can arise from the request 
itself. 
Zoumadakis argues that despite Dr. Mason's direct testimony regarding the 
legitimate basis for his request, it was clearly a malicious attempt to get rid of her and put 
her out of a job because Dr. Mason was the largest referral source for Uintah Basin's 
Home Health Division. Zoumadakis' argument is misleading. While Dr. Mason was the 
single largest referral source for Uintah Basin's Home Health Division, the evidence 
demonstrated that the actual percentage of Uintah Basin's Home Health patients referred 
by Dr. Mason was quite small - 26 out of 190 during 2003. R. 660 at 128; 133. 
Zoumadakis provided no evidence that Dr. Mason knew or believed that by requesting 
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that Zoumadakis not be assigned to his patients, he would cause her employment to 
terminate. Thus, that Dr. Mason did not want her to see his patients does not establish 
that his request was intended to, or would, lead to her termination. In fact, as Nielsen 
testified, Uintah Basin had ample other patients to keep Zoumadakis busy. R. 660 at 132-
33. That an inference of malice does not arise solely from Dr. Mason's request is 
particularly true given that both Dr. Mason and Nielsen testified Dr. Mason did not in any 
way request or suggest that Zoumadakis be terminated, or that any other action be taken 
against her. R. 660 at 132-33; 144; 221-22. Dr. Mason was not involved in the 
disciplinary process, and he testified that he was not aware Zoumadakis's employment 
with Uintah Basin had terminated until he was served with this lawsuit. R. 660 at 222. 
Finally, Zoumadakis claims malice was established through excessive publication. 
However, the evidence demonstrated that Dr. Mason raised his complaints regarding Ms. 
Zoumadakis only with Vicky Holzman, Lloyd Nielsen, Zoumadakis' supervisor, and 
Carlene Jensen, Uintah Basin's Director of Nursing. Zoumadakis suggests that Uintah 
Basin disseminated these statements into the community, and this dissemination resulted 
in excessive publication. Even if it were true that Uintah Basin disseminated the 
statements into the community, such dissemination by Uintah Basin provides no basis for 
finding excessive publication by Dr. Mason. Moreover, as set forth below at 24-28, 
Zoumadakis provided no evidence that Uintah Basin disseminated any statements by Dr. 
Mason into the community. 
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The evidence established that any statement made by Dr. Mason to Uintah Basin 
regarding Zoumadakis was true, and protected by a qualified privilege. The jury's 
verdict must therefore be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF APPELLEES 
Zoumadakis also claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
on the bulk of her defamation claim, which related to alleged statements by Uintah Basin, 
Carolyn Smith, Lloyd Nielsen, Carlene Jensen and Juanita Thacker, and Dr. Mason's 
report to Uintah Basin of a patient complaint that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol. For 
the reasons set forth below, the district court correctly granted summary judgment with 
respect to these statements. 
A. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With 
Respect to Dr. Mason's Alcohol Complaint Statement 
Zoumadakis claimed that Dr. Mason defamed her by reporting to Uintah Basin 
that he received a complaint from a patient that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol when 
visiting the patient. The district court correctly granted summary judgment with respect 
to this statement for multiple reasons. 
1. The Statement Was True 
At summary judgment, the undisputed evidence established the truth of Dr. 
Mason's statement. In connection with summary judgment, Dr. Mason provided an 
affidavit from the husband of his patient testifying that the patient and her husband 
complained to Dr. Mason that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol during a patient visit. R. 
233-35. Zoumadakis could not and did not dispute this evidence. Under Utah law, truth 
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is an absolute defense to an action for defamation. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 
49, 57 (Utah 1991). On appeal, as at summary judgment, Zoumadakis argues that 
summary judgment was not appropriate because the patient's complaint to Dr. Mason 
was not true, i.e., Zoumadakis did not smell of alcohol. As the district court correctly 
noted, however, the relevant issue was the truth of Dr. Mason's statement, not the truth of 
the patient's statement. R. 443. Dr. Mason did not say the patient's complaint was 
correct — he simply stated that he had received such a complaint from a patient. As the 
patient's affidavit established, Dr. Mason did in fact receive a complaint from a patient 
that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol. Thus, his statement to Uintah Basin was true and 
summary judgment should be affirmed. 
2. Dr. Mason's Statement Was Subject to A Qualified Privilege 
The district court also correctly dismissed Zoumadakis' complaint with respect to 
the alcohol statement because it was subject to a qualified privilege between Dr. Mason 
and Uintah Basin. Zoumadakis argues that even if Dr. Mason's statement to Uintah 
Basin was protected by a qualified privilege, summary judgment was inappropriate 
because the qualified privilege was overcome by malice. Opening Brief at 31-32. 
Zoumadakis first asserts malice existed because Dr. Mason knew the complaints were not 
true. This argument rests on testimony by Chris Dalsing, former director of Uintah 
Basin's physical therapy department, that the patient involved made numerous 
complaints to Uintah Basin about its personnel. However, Dalsing's testimony refers to 
patient complaints to Uintah Basin, not to Dr. Mason. Dalsing's testimony does not 
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establish, much less support, that Dr. Mason was aware of previous complaints by this 
patient regarding Uintah Basin personnel.6 Zoumadakis did not provide any evidence at 
summary judgment (or at trial) indicating that the patient had previously complained to 
Dr. Mason or that Dr. Mason was aware of the patient's complaints to others. Thus, 
Dalsing's testimony fails to establish malice on the part of Dr. Mason. 
Zoumadakis also argues that malice by Dr. Mason is established by his complaint 
to Uintah Basin, and his request that Zoumadakis not be assigned to his patients. As set 
forth in section 14-16 above, these actions fail to give rise to any inference of malice. 
Summary judgment was appropriate on this claim. 
B, The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With 
Respect to Carolyn Smith's Statement 
At summary judgment, Zoumadakis alleged, on information and belief, that 
Carolyn Smith, Dr. Mason's assistant, misrepresented to Dr. Mason that Zoumadakis was 
questioning his care. The district court correctly dismissed this claim based on 
Zoumadakis' testimony that she did not have actual knowledge of any conversations 
between Dr. Mason and Smith, but was basing her claim solely on information and belief. 
R. 442. On appeal, Zoumadakis challenges this ruling, citing to Smith's testimony at 
trial. The appropriateness of the district court's summary judgment ruling should be 
judged on the summary judgment record. A party cannot fail to submit controverting 
6
 In fact, Dalsing's testimony establishes only that he believed there had been 
previous complaints, not that any other Uintah Basin employee was aware of complaints. 
For example, Lloyd Neilsen testified he was not aware of any previous complaints. R. 
660 at 163. 
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evidence at summary judgment, and then challenge the grant of summary judgment based 
on trial evidence introduced in connection with a surviving claim. See Kirschner v. 
Uniden Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1988) (affidavits or other evidence 
not before the district court will not be considered on appeal in reviewing the district 
court's opinion). Zoumadakis had every opportunity to depose witnesses and develop the 
record for use at summary judgment. Zoumadakis cannot complain about the result when 
she chose to rely on her own unsupported assertions. To the extent Zoumadakis cites to 
the trial record rather than to the summary judgment record, her appeal must be rejected. 
In addition, even if such evidence is considered, the district court's dismissal of 
this claim must still be affirmed, because Smith's statement is subject to a qualified 
privilege and thus is not actionable. R. 442; Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58 (statements made to 
advance a legitimate common interest between the publisher and the recipient of the 
publication are subject to a qualified privilege). Zoumadakis acknowledges that such a 
privilege exists, but claims it is overcome by malice. However, at summary judgment, 
and again here, Zoumadakis acknowledges that she has no actual evidence of malice on 
the part of Smith, but instead speculates about possible malicious intent on the part of 
Smith. Opening Brief at 34 ("It is unknown why Smith would tell Dr. Mason that Ms. 
Zoumadakis was questioning his care. It is possible that. . . ."); R. 274 ("It may very well 
be that Defendant Smith told this to Mason to gain his objective to get rid of Melany.") 
Speculation is insufficient to oppose summary judgment, and the district court's grant of 
summary judgment on this portion of Zoumadakis' defamation claim must be affirmed. 
#248533 vl sic 
20 
C. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With 
Respect to the Corrective Disciplinary Action Report Prepared By 
Neilsen 
At summary judgment, Zoumadakis claimed that the report prepared by Neilson 
was defamatory. The district court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to 
this claim. As the district court noted, the undisputed evidence at summary judgment 
established that this report was not published to any third parties external to Uintah Basin 
management. R. 444. Neither below, nor on appeal, does Zoumadakis point to any 
evidence in the summary judgment record demonstrating that the report was published to 
third parties. Without publication, Zoumadakis' claim fails. DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 
111, f23, 992 P.2d 979 ("the requirement of'publication' means that the defamatory 
statement be communicated to a third person and that the third person read and 
understand the statement"). 
In connection with this argument, Zoumadakis once again inappropriately refers to 
trial evidence to support her claim that summary judgment should not have been granted. 
As set forth above, such evidence should not be considered, but even if it is, summary 
judgment must still be affirmed. For example, Zoumadakis argues that although Carlene 
Jensen testified that information in Uintah Basin's personnel files are not given to third 
parties, such testimony is not believable, particularly because Jensen testified that if she 
knew someone were fired because of patient complaints, it would affect her decision 
Moreover, to the extent review of the report by limited members of management 
was deemed publication, the report would be subject to a qualified privilege. Brehany, 
812 P.2d at 58-59. 
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regarding whether to hire such person. See Opening Brief at 35 ("It was not convincing 
that Ms. Jensen stated that the things in employee files are not disseminated to 
prospective employers. . . . It is beyond reason that the items in an employee file would 
not be subject to review by a further prospective employer.") These arguments are based 
on pure speculation and have no factual basis. Zoumadakis failed to adduce any evidence 
at summary judgment or at trial that the report had been published to third parties. The 
o 
district court's ruling should therefore be affirmed. 
D. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With 
Respect to Uintah Basin's Statements to the Department of Workforce 
Services 
Zoumadakis also alleged that Uintah Basin's statements to the Utah Department of 
Workforce Services that Zoumadakis quit were defamatory. The district court correctly 
granted summary judgment with respect to this claim. On appeal, Zoumadakis argues 
that the statement was false and was defamatory because she did not quit but was 
terminated. If the statement is not defamatory, the fact that it was false does not make it 
actionable. Moreover, while Zoumadakis asserts that the statement is defamatory, she 
fails to explain how stating someone quit is defamatory, as Utah law defines defamation 
as statements that "impeach an individual's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation or 
publish his or her natural defects or expose him or her to public hatred, contempt, or 
In addition, judgment on this portion of Zoumadakis' claim was appropriate 
because the alleged defamatory statements contained in the report are true, i.e., Uintah 
Basin in fact received complaints about Zoumadakis from Dr. Mason. 
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ridicule." Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988). On its face the statement is not 
defamatory and summary judgment was therefore appropriate.9 
E. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With 
Respect to Jensen's Alleged Statement in a Quality Control Meeting 
Zoumadakis claimed that she was defamed by Carlene Jensen's alleged statement 
to Chris Dalsing during a Quarterly Review meeting that Zoumadakis had been 
terminated due to a patient complaint about alcohol. The district court correctly granted 
summary judgment with respect to this statement because it was subject to a qualified 
privilege and because it was true. 
In asserting error by the district court, Zoumadakis first argues the district court 
erred in finding a qualified privilege applied, because contrary to the district court's 
conclusions, lower level non-management employees were present at that meeting, and 
some of them may have heard the statement. Opening Brief at 38-39. While 
Zoumadakis contends that lower level employees were present, she fails to cite to any 
evidence presented to the district court at summary judgment to support this assertion. 
See Opening Brief at 39. Moreover, as the district court noted, Zoumadakis' evidence 
established that the statements were only made to and heard by Chris Dalsing, then head 
of Uintah Basin's physical therapy department and clearly a member of management. R. 
445. Although Zoumadakis continues to speculate that others may have heard these 
9
 Also, Utah recognizes an absolute privilege to participants in judicial 
proceedings. Price v. Armor, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997). This privilege also 
applies to quasi-judicial proceedings, including administrative proceedings. Id; see Dorn 
v. Person, 512 N.W. 2d 902 (Minn. App. 1994) (employer's statement to unemployment 
compensation agency regarding reasons for termination is absolutely privileged.) 
23 
#248533 vl sic 
statements, neither at summary judgment nor on appeal does she point to evidence in 
support of this proposition. 
The district court also correctly found that the statement was substantially true, as 
a patient in fact complained that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol during a visit, R. 233-35, 
and that complaint eventually resulted in Zoumadakis leaving her employment with 
Uintah Basin. Summary judgment was therefore appropriately granted on this claim. 
F. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With 
Respect to Alleged Statements By Unidentified Uintah Basin Personnel 
to Community Members 
In response to appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment, Zoumadakis provided 
the Court with letters from certain community members who reported hearing from 
various unspecified sources that Zoumadakis was fired and the alleged reason for her 
termination. R. 283-93. The district court correctly granted summary judgment on this 
claim for several reasons. First, at least one of the letters rested on hearsay, which is 
inadmissible and therefore could not provide a basis for denying summary judgment; 
second, to the extent the statements arose from conversations among community 
members, Uintah Basin had no responsibility or ability to police community 
conversations; and third, Zoumadakis failed to provide evidence demonstrating that 
Uintah Basin was responsible for the statements of unidentified employees under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior liability. R. 283, 285; 446. 
Zoumadakis argues that the district court erred by failing to give her the 
opportunity to prove that the rumors and other statements came from Uintah Basin 
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employees. However, this argument ignores Zoumadakis' burden at summary judgment. 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 56, when summary judgment is sought and properly supported, 
Zoumadakis may not rest on mere allegations but must come forward with specific facts, 
by affidavit or otherwise, to demonstrate that a genuine issue of fact exists. Thornock v. 
Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). While Zoumadakis provided affidavits in support 
of this piece of her claim, as the district court found, Zoumadakis5 affidavits failed to 
provide specific, admissible evidence that, if believed, was sufficient to establish Uintah 
Basin's responsibility for the alleged statements. 
First, several of the affidavits did not identify or connect the alleged speakers to 
Uintah Basin. R. 287, 293. Uintah Basin cannot be held responsible for statements of 
third parties not connected to Uintah Basin. Moreover, to the extent Zoumadakis' 
affidavits stated that the alleged statements came from Uintah Basin employees, the 
affidavits did not identify the employees. R. 283, 285. Uintah Basin could potentially be 
vicariously liable for allegedly defamatory statements of its employees, if at all, pursuant 
to the doctrine of respondeat superior. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1057 
(Utah 1989). To avoid summary judgment, Zoumadakis had to provide evidence that at 
trial would be sufficient to establish that the statements were made in the scope of the 
speaker's employment. Id. That analysis requires proof of three factors: 1) the unnamed 
employee's alleged defamatory conduct is of the general kind he/she was employed to 
perform; 2) his/her's alleged defamatory conduct occurred within the hours of the 
employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment; and 3) his/her 
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alleged conduct v/as motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's 
interest. Id. 
As a matter of law, because neither of the affidavits provided by Zoumadakis 
specifically identified the speaker, Zoumadakis did not provide evidence from which a 
jury could determine the speaker was acting within the scope of his /her employment. 
Zoumadakis did not provide evidence to establish the first element, that the unnamed 
employees' duties including commenting on the reasons for Zoumadakis' termination. 
To the contrary, Uintah Basin provided undisputed evidence that the duties of its 
employees did not include discussing the termination of co-employees with third parties, 
thereby precluding a finding that the alleged speaker was acting within the scope of 
his/her employment. R. 424-25. 
Nor did Zoumadakis provide evidence of the third factor, that the unnamed 
employees were motivated by serving Uintah Basin's interests. Zoumadakis provided no 
evidence that the unnamed employees were acting to serve Uintah Basin's interests, and 
on its face, the alleged statement at best appears to be idle gossip. Many courts have 
refused to attribute an employee's defamatory statements to the employer in the absence 
of evidence that the employee was acting in the company's interest. Martineau v. Arco 
Chem. Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20956, at *38-39 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 1998)10 
(employer could not be held liable where the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate how a 
Copies of unpublished cases are attached hereto, including: Martineau v. Arco 
Chem. Co., Lamson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., and Corradi v. Emmco Corp. 
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supervisory employee's statements that another employee was a liar and was sleeping 
with a co-employee were advancing the interests of the employer) affd, 203 F.3d 904 (5th 
Cir. 2000); see also Allstate Insur. Co. v. Quick, 254 F. Supp. 2d 706, 715-16 (S.D. Ohio 
2002) (employee's publication of defamatory statements outside the company's formal 
grievance procedure is outside the scope of employment and employer not liable). 
As numerous courts have found, an employer is not responsible for the 
unauthorized gossip of its employees and supervisors. See Lamson v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., No. 14692, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1010, at *8 (Ohio App. Mar. 13, 1991) 
(company whose employee published within the company sexual harassment accusations 
about another employee could not be held liable for defamation under principles of 
respondeat superior); Danawala v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 14 F.3d 251, 255 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (employer not liable for defamatory comments of employee); Corradi v. 
Emmco Corp., No. 67407, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 510, at *7-8 (Ohio App. Feb. 15, 
1996) (same). The affidavits provided by Zoumadakis were therefore insufficient as a 
matter of law to defeat summary judgment. 
Zoumadakis argues that the district court should have found Uintah Basin was or 
could have been responsible for such statements without resort to principles of respondeat 
superior. In fact, respondeat superior is the only vehicle by which Uintah Basin can be 
liable for such statements. See S.H. by and through R.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1366 
(Utah 1993) (generally, an employer is not liable for the intentional torts of his 
employees unless the tort is committed within the scope of employment); Hodges, 811 
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P.2d at 156-157 (employer's liability for employee's intentional and negligent torts 
dependent on whether the acts are committed within the scope of employment). Because 
Zoumadakis failed to come forward with evidence that, if believed, was sufficient to 
establish such liability on the part of Uintah Basin for its employees' alleged statements, 
the district court properly granted summary judgment on this part of Zoumadakis' claim. 
G. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment With 
Respect to Statements of Juanita Thacker 
At summary judgment, Zoumadakis, for the first time, also claimed she was 
defamed by the statements of Juanita Thacker, a Uintah Basin employee. The district 
court appropriately dismissed Zoumadakis' defamation claim with respect to Thacker's 
statements because Zoumadakis failed to raise these allegations in her complaint, and 
because the alleged statements were substantially true. On appeal, Zoumadakis argues 
that dismissal on the grounds this statement was not plead in her Complaint was error 
because she did not know about the statement until after appellees' summary judgment 
had been made, and her failure to identify the statement in the complaint did not matter, 
because it was "just further evidence that UBMC had improperly disseminated 
defamatory statements against Ms. Zoumadakis . . . . " Opening Brief at 40. This 
argument misses the point. Defamation must be plead with particularity to allow the 
defendant to adequately discover and defend against such a claim. See Williams v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). The witness on which Zoumadakis relied 
in connection with Thacker's alleged statement was available to Zoumadakis, yet she 
failed to identify this statement in either her complaint or at her deposition. In so doing, 
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Zoumadakis deprived appellees of the opportunity to conduct discovery regarding the 
statement. The district court therefore appropriately granted summary judgment with 
respect to this statement. 
In addition, as the district court noted, Thacker's alleged statement - that Uintah 
Basin had received a complaint regarding the smell of alcohol on Zoumadakis' breath 
and that Thacker had received a previous complaint regarding Zoumadakis - was 
substantially true. As set forth above, Uintah Basin learned from Dr. Mason that a patient 
had complained Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol during a patient visit. In addition, 
Thacker testified by affidavit that she had previously received a complaint about 
I 
Zoumadakis using alcohol. R. 428-29. At summary judgment, Zoumadakis did not 
I 
provide any evidence to dispute Thacker's affidavit. 
Finally, summary judgment was appropriate on this claim because Thacker's 
statement was subject to a qualified privilege. The statement was allegedly made to 
Linda Cook, who at the time managed the Vernal durable medical equipment office 
operated by Uintah Basin's Home Health Division. R. 424. Thacker was a Home Health 
Supervisor. R. 428-29. Statements between the two were therefore subject to a qualified 
privilege, see above at 20, and Zoumadakis failed to provide any evidence of malice on 
the part of Thacker. 
in . THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF ZOUMADAKIS' SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MUST BE AFFIRMED 
In her docketing statement, Zoumadakis identified as an issue for appeal whether 
the district court erred in denying Zoumadakis' cross-motion for summary judgment 
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seeking judgment in her favor on her motion for summary judgment. Zoumadakis failed 
to provide any argument in her brief and it is therefore waived. Water Energy, 2002 UT 
32atU13n.2. 
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CROSS-APPEAL 
In the event the Court reverses the jury's verdict in Dr. Mason's favor, Dr. Mason 
cross-appeals the district court's denial of summary judgment with respect to one alleged 
statement by Dr. Mason and his denial of Dr. Mason's directed verdict motion. This 
appeal is conditional on reversal of the jury verdict in Dr. Mason's favor. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in denying Dr. Mason summary judgment 
on Zoumadakis' defamation claim with respect to his alleged statement to Uintah Basin 
that Zoumadakis questioned his treatment with a patient or that she was practicing 
medicine without a license. Summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correctness, 
with no deference accorded the district court. Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 
87, 171P.3d442. | 
2. Whether the district court erred in denying Dr. Mason's motion for a 
directed verdict at the close of evidence. In reviewing a challenge to the trial court's 
denial of a motion for a directed verdict, the appellate court reviews "the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the party moved against, and will sustain the denial if reasonable minds could disagree 
with the ground asserted for directing a verdict." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., et. al, 
2003 UT 41,112, 82P.3dl064. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee and cross-appellant Dr. Mason adopts the statement of the case and facts 
set forth above at 2-7. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In the event the Court reverses the jury verdict in Dr. Mason's favor, the Court 
should order judgment affirmed for Dr. Mason, as the district court erred in failing to 
grant summary judgment and a directed verdict to Dr. Mason with respect to his 
statement to Uintah Basin regarding Zoumadakis' interaction with his patient. As the 
district court found, communications between Dr. Mason and Uintah Basin regarding 
their common patients were subject to a qualified privilege. Neither at summary 
judgment nor at trial did Zoumadakis provide evidence sufficient to establish malice on 
the part of Dr. Mason. The district court therefore erred in failing to grant summary 
judgment and a directed verdict in Dr. Mason's favor. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO DR. MASON 
At summary judgment, the district court found, as a matter of law, that a 
conditional privilege existed between Uintah Basin and Dr. Mason that protected 
statements by Dr. Mason to Uintah Basin regarding Zoumadakis and her treatment of Dr. 
Mason's patients. However, the district court denied summary judgment to Dr. Mason 
with respect to his statement regarding Zoumadakis' interaction with his patient, holding 
that whether malice existed was a question of fact. In fact, Zoumadakis provided no 
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evidence of malice and summary judgment should have been granted on her claim 
against Dr. Mason in its entirety. 
As noted above, to demonstrate malice sufficient to overcome a qualified privilege 
requires evidence of ill will, excessive publication or that the defendant did not 
reasonably believe his statements. In opposing summary judgment, Zoumadakis argued 
that malice existed with respect to Dr. Mason because "Dr. Mason made UBMC a great 
deal of money. Although the Plaintiff did not question Mason's statements, he wanted 
her gone. The way to do so would be to maliciously spread untruths about her 
questioning his care of patients, and stating that she told patients to get a second 
opinion." R. 273-74. On its face, this argument contains only unsupported speculation, 
rather than evidence, that Dr. Mason acted out of malice or some intent to get rid of 
Zoumadakis. Unsubstantiated argument and conclusions are insufficient to defeat 
summary judgment. Winter v. Nw, Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991) 
(plaintiffs reliance on his own unsupported conclusions without evidentiary support is 
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment); Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 
747, 748 (Utah 1985) (affidavit and arguments based solely on unsubstantiated opinion 
and belief is insufficient to defeat summary judgment). 
Moreover, to the extent Zoumadakis was suggesting that malice was established 
by Dr. Mason's request that Zoumadakis not see his patients, this statement did not create 
an issue of fact with respect to malice. At summary judgment, the evidence and any 
reasonable inferences therefrom are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Beehive 
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Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). As noted 
above at 14-16, given Dr. Mason's legitimate concern regarding the effect of 
Zoumadakis' statements on his relationship with his patient and his patient's medical 
care, and the evidence from both Dr. Mason and Nielsen that Dr. Mason did not request 
any other action be taken against Zoumadakis, malice cannot reasonably be inferred from 
his complaint to Uintah Basin about Zoumadakis. 
At summary judgment, Zoumadakis also claimed that she had evidence of malice 
because Uintah Basin disseminated the information into the community through nurses 
and employees. However, Zoumadakis' allegations regarding excessive dissemination 
are all related to actions by Uintah Basin, not Dr. Mason. Uintah Basin's actions can not 
establish malice on the part of Dr. Mason. Moreover, as the district court acknowledged, 
Zoumadakis failed to provide any evidence at summary judgment from which a fact 
finder could conclude Uintah Basin was responsible for disseminating any information 
regarding Zoumadakis into the community. R. 446 and above at 24-28. Thus, this 
argument does not support her claim of malice, and summary judgment should have been 
granted in Dr. Mason's favor. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DR. MASON'S 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
Similarly, the district court erred in failing to grant Dr. Mason's motion for a 
directed verdict at the close of Zoumadakis' case. Following the close of Zoumadakis' 
case, Dr. Mason moved for a directed verdict on the ground that Zoumadakis had failed 
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to provide any evidence of malice sufficient to overcome the qualified privilege the 
district court found protected communications between Dr. Mason and Uintah Basin. 
Again, the malice required to overcome a qualified privilege requires evidence of 
ill will, excessive publication or that the defendant did not reasonably believe his 
statements. Russell 842 P.2d at 904-05. As set forth above at 14-15, at trial, Dr. Mason 
articulated a reasonable, non-malicious basis for his alleged statements to Uintah Basin -
the effect Zoumadakis9 statements had on his patients, his concern over the potential 
negative effect of such statements on treatment and the fact that this was not the first time 
Zoumadakis had questioned his treatment with patients. R. 660 at 205; 214-20. 
Zoumadakis failed to introduce any direct evidence of ill will on Dr. Mason's part or any 
evidence that countered Dr. Mason's legitimate concerns. 
While Zoumadakis argues that ill will or malice could be inferred because Dr. 
Mason told Uintah Basin he did not want Zoumadakis to see his patients any longer and 
would refer patients to another home health care agency if Uintah Basin continued to 
assign Zoumadakis to see his patients, this statement does not lead to an inference of 
malice. As set forth above at 15-16, there is simply no such basis for the inference 
Zoumadakis seeks to draw. Dr. Mason had a legitimate reason for his comments, he did 
not request that any action be taken against Zoumadakis, he was not involved in the 
disciplinary process and was unaware that Zoumadakis' employment had terminated until 
her complaint was filed and served upon him. 
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Zoumadakis failed to provide any evidence indicating that Dr. Mason's statements 
were motivated by malice or ill will as opposed to his legitimate concern over his 
patients. Nor did Zoumadakis provide any evidence that Dr. Mason made the statements 
to anyone except Lloyd Neilsen, Vicky Holtzman or Carlene Jensen. Finally, 
Zoumadakis did not supply any evidence that Dr. Mason did not believe his statement 
was correct at the time he made it, and in fact, he testified that his call to Uintah Basin 
was triggered by his patient's report that Zoumadakis had questioned the treatment Dr. 
Mason prescribed. The trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict in favor of 
Dr. Mason at the close of evidence, and, to the extent the jury's verdict is reversed, the 
Court should therefore order that judgment be entered for Dr. Mason on the basis that the 
district court erred in denying Dr. Mason's motion for a directed verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
For the rezisons stated above, in the event this Court reverses the jury verdict in Dr. 
Mason's favor, the district court should order that judgment be entered in favor of Dr. 
Mason on the ground (i) the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to Dr. Mason 
with respect to his alleged statement to Uintah Basin regarding Zoumadakis and (ii) the 
trial court erred in not granting a directed verdict in Dr. Mason's favor. 
DATED this / / day of December, 2008. 
jilahfe J. Benard 
Carolyn Cox 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP 
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CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant employer filed 
a motion for partial summary judgment in plaintiff em-
ployee's action that alleged employment discrimination 
based on national origin in violation of the Texas Com-
mission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 
21.001 et seq. (1996), defamation, and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Defendant also filed a motion 
for summary judgment on plaintifTs supplemental slan-
der claim. 
OVERVIEW: Plaintiff employee filed suit against de-
fendant employer, alleging discrimination based on na-
tional origin in violation of the Texas Commission on 
Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.001 et 
seq. (1996), intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and defamation. Defendant filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment and a motion for summary judgment 
on a supplemental slander claim filed by plaintiff. The 
court granted the motions. The court found that plaintiff 
offered insufficient evidence to raise fact questions as to 
the falsity of defendant's reason for his termination, con-
cluding that defendant had relied upon its employee's 
complaints about plaintiff in good faith. The court also 
found that there was insufficient evidence to sustain 
plaintifTs emotional distress claim because the conduct 
complained of was not so extreme to be regarded as be-
yond the bounds of decency. The court further found that 
plaintiff failed to show that a co-employee's statements 
were made within the scope of her employment so as to 
raise a fact issue concerning defamation. Moreover, the 
court found that plaintiffs supplemental slander claim 
was based on non-actionable opinions. 
OUTCOME: The court granted defendant employer's 
motion for partial summary judgment and motion for 
summary judgment on plaintiff employee's supplemental 
slander claim. Plaintiff offered insufficient evidence to 
raise questions of fact as to whether defendant1 s prof-
fered reason for plaintifTs termination was false because 
whether or not the complaints made against plaintiff 
were false, defendant relied upon the complaints in good 
faith. 
CORE TERMS: summary judgment, termination, su-
pervisor, defamation, defamatory, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, prima facie case, national origin, 
liar, hostile, sexual harassment, undisputed, proffered, 
defamed, slander, gossip, harassment, balling, reply, di-
rect evidence, discriminatory, genuine, subordinate, irra-
tional, deposition, actionable, delusional, workplace, 
falsely, insane 
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Overview 
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Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Dispa-
rate Treatment > General Overview 
[HN5] If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a pre-
sumption of discrimination is created, and the burden of 
production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If the de-
fendant satisfies this burden, the presumption disappears, 
and the plaintiff must prove that the proffered reasons are 
a pretext for discrimination. Throughout the case, the 
plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuading the 
finder of fact not only that the defendant's reasons are 
pretextual, but also that the defendant intentionally dis-
criminated against the plaintiff. Even if the defendant's 
proffered reason is rejected, enough evidence must exist 
in the record for the factfinder to infer that discrimination 
was the true reason for the disparate treatment. However, 
the factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by 
the defendant, particularly if disbelief is accompanied by 
a suspicion of mendacity, may, together with the ele-
ments of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional 
discrimination. 
Evidence > Inferences <fc Presumptions > General 
Overview 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Dispa-
rate Treatment > General Overview 
[HN6] A plaintiff cannot succeed by proving only that 
the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual. Rather, a 
reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimina-
tion unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and 
that discrimination was the real reason. 
Evidence > Relevance > Relevant Evidence 
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show an indicium of discrimination under Tide VII of 
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Overview 
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motives instruction is the presentation of direct evidence 
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[HN12] In order to recover damages for intentional in-
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defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the 
defendant's actions caused the plaintiff emotional dis-
tress; and, (4) the resulting emotional distress was se-
vere. Liability for outrageous conduct should be found 
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in char-
acter, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all pos-
sible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, 
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. 
Torts > Intentional Torts > Intentional Infliction of 
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Torts > Vicarious Liability > Employers > Activities A 
Conditions > Intentional Torts 
[HN13] An employer's conduct, even if a violation under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, rises to the 
level of extreme and outrageous in only the most unusual 
cases. Complaints that fall within the realm of an ordi-
nary employment dispute do not suffice for a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > General 
Overview 
Torts > Vicarious Liability > Employers 
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[HN17] A statement is defamatory if the words tend to 
injure a person's reputation, exposing the person to pub-
lic hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury. 
Whether a document or statement is reasonably capable 
of a defamatory meaning is an issue of law for the court. 
All assertions of opinion are protected by the U.S. Const, 
amend. I and Tex. Const, art. I, § 8. Thus, an essential 
element of a defamation cause of action is that the al-
leged defamatory statement be a statement of fact rather 
than opinion. Whether a statement is an opinion or an 
assertion of fact is also a question of law. 
Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental 
Freedoms > Freedom of Speech > Defamation > Gen-
eral Overview 
Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > General 
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[HN18] In distinguishing between fact and opinion, the 
court should analyze the common usage of the specific 
language to determine whether it has a precise, well un-
derstood core of meaning that conveys facts, or whether 
the statement is indefinite and ambiguous; assess the 
statement's verifiability, that is, whether it is objectively 
capable of being proven true or false; consider the entire 
context of the article or column, including cautionary 
language; and evaluate the kind of writing or speech as 
to its presentation as commentary or "hard" news. This 
inquiry should help determine, for example, whether the 
statement is to be taken as precise and literal or loose and 
figurative, and whether the language is employed as 
metaphor or hyperbole, or to convey actual facts. 
Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > Defamation 
PerSe 
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OPINION BY: NANCY F. ATLAS 
OPINION: 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
Pending before the Court in this employment dis-
crimination case is Defendant's Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment [Doc. # 17] ("Motion"), and Defendant 
ARCO Chemical Company's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiffs Supplemental Slander Claim 
[Doc. # 29] ("Supplemental Motion"). Plaintiff has re-
sponded to both motions, and the parties have filed vari-
ous replies, nl Having considered the motions and brief-
ing, matters of record, and relevant authorities, the Court 
concludes that both of Defendant's motions should be 
granted. 
nl See Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. # 26] (Re-
sponse); Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Sup-
plemental Slander Claim [Doc. # 36] ("Response 
to Supplemental Motion"); Plaintiffs Reply to 
Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Response to De-
fendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 
37] ("Sur-Reply"); Plaintiffs Supplemental Re-
sponse to Defendant's Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment on Plaintiffs Supplemental Slan-
der Claim [Doc. # 3 8 ] ("Supplemental Re-
sponse"). Defendant ARCO filed a Reply on the 
original motion, but did not file a reply on the 
supplemental motion. See Defendant's Reply to 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. # 35] ("Re-
ply"). 
[*2] 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant ARCO Chemical Company ("ARCO" or 
"Defendant") makes and manufactures chemicals and 
specialty products. See Affidavit of Douglas Mathera 
(Exhibit A to Motion) ("Mathera Affidavit"), P 3. Plain-
tiff began working with ARCO's predecessor company, 
Oxyraine, at the Bayport Plant in Pasadena, Texas, in 
1976. See Deposition of Richard Martineau (Exhibit B to 
Motion) ("Martineau Deposition"), at 19-20; Affidavit 
of Jetola Anderson (Exhibit C to Motion) ("Anderson 
Affidavit"), P 2. During his tenure with ARCO, Plaintiff 
held various jobs, including lab technician, shift fore-
man, and senior chemist. See Martineau Deposition, at 
21; Anderson Affidavit, P 2. 
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While working as a laboratory shift supervisor in 
early 1996, several other ARCO employees began to 
complain about Plaintiffs behavior in the workplace. 
Technicians, chemists, and other supervisors revealed 
that Plaintiff routinely cursed, yelled, and slammed 
doors. See Affidavit of Eric Kolodziej (Exhibit D to Mo-
tion) ("Kolodziej Affidavit"), P 4. Thereafter, Plaintiffs 
Supervisor, Eric Kolodziej ("Kolodziej") counseled 
Plaintiff. Kolodziej also noted in Plaintiffs performance 
[*3] review that Plaintiff had become more volatile, and 
that Plaintiff was creating an unpleasant and hostile work 
environment for his subordinates. See id.; Deposition of 
Eric Kolodziej (Exhibit E to Motion) ("Kolodziej Depo-
sition"), at 40—41. In order to assist Plaintiff in address-
ing these issues, ARCO arranged and paid for Plaintiff to 
attend an interpersonal skills class in Chicago. See Mar-
tineau Deposition, at 49—50; Anderson Affidavit, P 4; 
Kolodziej Affidavit, P 5. 
Plaintiff found the course to be valuable, and ini-
tially seemed to have addressed his interpersonal issues. 
See Martineau Deposition, at 51; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 
5. In April 1996, however, Lisa Sweeney ("Sweeney"), 
previously a party to this lawsuit, n2 complained to Ko-
lodziej, suggesting that the interpersonal issues had not 
been resolved. Sweeney complained that Plaintiff still 
had temper flare-ups and also was following her around 
the ARCO plant. See Kolodziej Affidavit, P 6; Kolodziej 
Deposition, at 46—47. Kolodziej warned Plaintiff that he 
should monitor his behavior with subordinates. See Ko-
lodziej Affidavit, P 8. Kolodziej encouraged Plaintiff to 
seek counseling through ARCO's Employee [*4] Assis-
tance Program, but Plaintiff declined. See id. P 8. Kolod-
ziej informed Plaintiff that any additional inappropriate 
behavior would result in mandatory counseling. See id. 
n2 Plaintiff settled his claims against Sweeney 
while this case was in state court. Sweeney's 
elimination from the lawsuit was a predicate to 
this Court's removal jurisdiction. 
The record establishes that Plaintiff perceived that 
Sweeney and Plaintiff had become friends outside of 
work. See Affidavit of Richard Martineau (Exhibit 1 to 
Response) ("Martineau Affidavit"), P 39. From May 
1995 until August 1996, Sweeney asked Plaintiff for 
financial assistance, and took cash and checks from 
Plaintiff, promising to pay him back. See id. PP 39—45. 
Sweeney also apparently began to confide in Plaintiff, 
and reveal to him intimate details about her life. See id. P 
47. Sweeney regarded Plaintiff as an "older friend" and 
something of a father figure. See Deposition of Lisa 
Sweeney (Exhibit 11 to Response) ("Sweeney Deposi-
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tion"), [*5] at 56. She also called him at home and vis-
ited his house. See id. at 55—56. According to Plaintiff, 
because Sweeney had not paid him back for money he 
loaned her, Plaintiff informed Sweeney that she would 
have to begin making monthly payments to him in Sep-
tember 1996. 
Again in August 1996, three technicians complained 
to Kolodziej about Plaintiffs volatile behavior. See id. P 
9. Once again, Kolodziej counseled Plaintiff about ap-
propriate workplace conduct. See id. 
In September 1996, Sweeney complained to Defen-
dant again about Plaintiff, this time to ARCO's Human 
Resources Department ("HR"). See Sweeney Deposition, 
at 87—88; Anderson Affidavit, P 5; Affidavit of Vernon 
Gilliam (Exhibit H to Motion) ("Gilliam Affidavit"), P 3; 
Exhibit I to Motion (Anderson's handwritten notes of 
Sept. 6, 1996 meeting with Sweeney). Sweeney com-
plained that: Plaintiff gave her a poem entitled "Charac-
teristics That Made Me 'Love You,'" describing 
Sweeney's "great passion of fulfilling physical love," her 
"most gorgeous eyes," her "beauty," and Plaintiffs desire 
to "be a part of [her] life"; Plaintiff attempted to call 
Sweeney at home repeatedly; Plaintiff stared at her con-
stantly [*6] at work; Plaintiff remarked to her, "the 
things I have done to your body in my dreams," and that 
such caused "men have to get up and wash their sheets;" 
and Plaintiff made tape recordings speculating about 
Sweeney's personal life. See Sweeney Deposition, at 87— 
90; 198-200; Anderson Affidavit, PP 6, 8; Gilliam Affi-
davit, P 4; "Characteristics That Made Me 'Love You'" 
(Exhibit J to Motion) ("Poem"). 
Plaintiff admitted giving Sweeney the poem. See 
Anderson Affidavit, P 8; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 11. 
ARCO management considered this to be inappropriate 
under any circumstances. See Anderson Affidavit, P 8; 
Kolodziej Affidavit, P 11. In the context of Plaintiffs 
previous interpersonal issues, ARCO management de-
termined that it would be best to transfer Plaintiff to a 
professional, non-supervisory role and prohibit all non-
work-related contact with Sweeney. See Anderson Affi-
davit, PP 9-10; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 11. ARCO as-
signed Plaintiff to a non-supervisory chemist position, 
working straight days instead of shift work, with no de-
crease in pay. See Martineau Deposition, at 118; Ander-
son Affidavit, P 7; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 12. ARCO 
instructed Plaintiff to stop all [*7] non-work-related 
contact with Sweeney. Plaintiff agreed to this instruction. 
See Anderson Affidavit, P 10; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 11. 
Plaintiff also was required to attend counseling. See 
Anderson Affidavit, P 10; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 11-12. 
Despite ARCO's instructions and his agreement, 
Plaintiff called Sweeney at home at 11:48 p.m. one night 
in September. See Martineau Deposition, at 125—27; 
Anderson Affidavit, PP 11-12. Although Plaintiff hung 
up immediately, the call was recorded on Sweeney's 
Caller ID. See Exhibit K (photograph of Sweeney's 
"Caller ID" box); Sweeney Deposition, at 195-98. Plain-
tiff claims he may have called Sweeney's number inad-
vertently and immediately hung up. See Martineau 
Deposition, at 125—28; Anderson Affidavit, P 12. 
Sweeney complained of the call to ARCO's HR Depart-
ment. See Anderson Affidavit, P 11; Sweeney Deposi-
tion, at 195-98. ARCO did not discipline Plaintiff in 
connection with this violation, but warned him that any 
further contact with Sweeney would result in disciplinary 
action. See Martineau Deposition, at 129—31; Anderson 
Affidavit, P 12. 
Plaintiff left work on sick leave in November 1996. 
See Kolodziej [*8] Affidavit, P 15. Despite his sick 
leave, and despite the fact that Plaintiffs position was a 
day job, Plaintiff went to the workplace twice while 
Sweeney was working the night shift. Sweeney reported 
to an ARCO supervisor that these visits made her un-
comfortable. See id. After determining that Plaintiff has 
no legitimate work-related reasons to be at the Plant, 
JCotodziej told Plaintiff that his behavior appeared suspi-
cious. Plaintiff claimed that he needed to get his wallet 
and check his mail. See id.; Martineau Deposition, at 
148. Kolodziej instructed Plaintiff not to come to the 
ARCO plant again without a work-related reason. 
Sweeney continued to experience suspicious hang-
up calls at her home. She asked the Mont Belvieu Police 
Department and the GTE phone company for assistance 
to trace the calls. See Sweeney Deposition, at 95—95, 
120-21. A GTE tracing device showed that three late-
night phone calls on November 8, 9, and 10 were made 
to Sweeney's home from Plaintiffs telephone number. 
See Exhibit M (telephone trace records); Sweeney Depo-
sition, at 106—07, 117. Sweeney presented this evidence 
to Defendant ARCO's HR Department. See Anderson 
Affidavit, P 15; [*9] Gilliam Affidavit, P 5; Sweeney 
Deposition, at 121, 189. 
Anderson spoke with the Mont Belvieu Police, who 
confirmed the authenticity of Sweeney's evidence. See 
Anderson Affidavit, P 16; Gilliam Affidavit, P 5; 
Sweeney Deposition, at 189-90. Anderson and Kolod-
ziej met with Plaintiff. Plaintiff denied making the calls, 
but was unable to present any credible explanation dis-
puting Sweeney's evidence. See Anderson Affidavit, PP 
17-18; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 18; ARCO Chemical 
Company, Internal Correspondence, dated Dec. 3, 1996 
(Exhibit V to Motion). ARCO decided to terminate 
Plaintiff for violating its instructions not to contact 
Sweeney. See Anderson Affidavit, P 18; Kolodziej Affi-
davit, P 18; Gilliam Affidavit, P 6; Internal Correspon-
dence. 
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Plaintiff filed a written appeal of his termination, but 
did not claim that he was terminated because of his na-
tional origin or citizenship. 
HR Manager Vern Gilliam reviewed Plaintiffs ap-
peal and found no basis to reverse the termination deci-
sion. See Gilliam Affidavit, PP 11-12. Gilliam had in-
formed Plaintiff in writing that unless he could produce 
relevant evidence, as opposed to mere allegations, 
ARCO would have to accept [*10] the police and phone 
records as authentic. See id. Plaintiff did not respond. See 
Martineau Deposition, at 174—75. 
Plaintiff originally sued ARCO in state court, argu-
ing that: (1) ARCO discriminated against him based on 
his national origin in violation of the Texas Commission 
on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), TEX. LAB. CODE 
ANN. § 21.001 et seq. (Vemon 1996); (2) ARCO de-
famed him; and (3) ARCO intentionally inflicted emo-
tional distress upon him. Defendant ARCO removed this 
case on May 22, 1998, contending that diversity jurisdic-
tion existed, and that Sweeney was fraudulently joined. 
The Court denied Plaintiffs motion to remand. Defen-
dant ARCO moves for summary judgment dismissing all 
claims. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
[HN1] In deciding a motion for summary judgment, 
the Court must determine whether "the pleadings, depo-
sitions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. Ml 
U.S. 317. 322-23, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 
(1986); f»ll] Little v. Liquid Air Corp.. 37 F.3d 1069. 
1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Boze v. Branstetter. 912 
R2d 801, 804 (5th Cir. 1990). The facts are to be re-
viewed with all inferences drawn in favor of the party 
opposing the motion. See Boze, 912 F.2d at 804 (citing 
Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 784 F.2d 577, 
578 (5th Cir. 1986)). However, factual controversies are 
resolved in favor of the nonmovant "only when there is 
an actual controversy—that is, wheil both parties have 
submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Laughlin v. 
Olszewski. 102 F.3d 190. 193 (5th Cir. 1996). 
Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment, 
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 
against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing of 
the existence of an element essential to the party's case, 
and on which that party will bear the burden at trial. See 
Little. 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Celotex. 477 U.S. at 322). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Defendant moves for summary judgment dismissing 
all Plaintiffs claims. Defendant argues, first, that Plain-
tiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
based on his national origin, nor can he proffer evidence 
[*12] rebutting Defendant's legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for his termination. Defendant also argues 
that Plaintiffs slander and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claims must fail because: (1) the alleged 
conduct was neither defamatory nor outrageous as a mat-
ter of law; (2) most of the alleged conduct occurred out-
side the limitations period; (3) the alleged statements 
were not referable to or in discharge of the duties the 
purported speakers owed to ARCO; (4) the alleged 
statements and conduct were not and could not have been 
ratified by ARCO; and (5) most of the alleged statements 
were privileged. 
A. Discrimination Claims 
Plaintiff sues Defendant ARCO for discrimination, 
based on his Canadian origin, under the Texas Commis-
sion on Human Rights Act ("THCRA"). [HN2] One of 
the express purposes of the Act is to "provide for the 
execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act ofT964 and its subsequent amendments (42 U.S.C. 
Section 2000e et seq.)." TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. $ 
21.001(1) (Vernon 1996); Schroeder v. Texas Iron 
Works. Inc.. 813 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex. 1991). There-
fore, courts must look to analogous federal law when 
resolving claims brought under [*13] Title VII. See 
Leatherwood v. Houston Post Co., 59 F.3d 533, 536 n.5 
(5th Cir. 1995). 
Defendant ARCO maintains that Plaintiffs discrimi-
nation claims must fail because he cannot establish a 
prima facie case, cannot rebut Defendant's legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for his termination, and cannot 
raise fact issues regarding his hostile environment claim. 
[HN3] Title VQ makes it unlawful for an employer 
to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an indi-
vidual with respect to that person's compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, or to otherwise 
adversely affect the person's status as an employee, be-
cause of that person's race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
Each plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a 
prima facie case of intentional discrimination. See St. 
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks. 509 U.S. 502, 507, 508, 125 
L. Ed. 2d 407, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993): Meinecke v. H & 
R Block of Houston. 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995). 
[HN4] In a suit alleging discriminatory discharge, 
the requirements of a prima facie case are: (1) that Plain-
tiff is a member of a protected class; (2) that Plaintiff 
was qualified for the position he held; (3) [*14] that 
Plaintiff was discharged; and (4) that, after Plaintiffs 
discharge, his employer replaced him with a person who 
is not a member of the protected class, or, in a case in 
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which the employer discharges Plaintiff and does not 
replace him, that, after the discharge, others who were 
not members of the protected class remained in similar 
positions. See Meinecke v. H & R Block of Houston. 66 
F.3d 77. 83 (5th Cir. 1995): EEOCv. Texas Instruments. 
Inc., 100 F.3d 1173. 1180 (5th Cir. 1996). 
[HN5] If Plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, 
a presumption of discrimination is created, and the bur-
den of production shifts to Defendant to articulate a le-
gitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See St. 
Mary's Honor Ctr.. 509 U.S. at 506-07; Meinecke. 66 
F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995). If Defendant satisfies this 
burden, the presumption disappears and Plaintiff must 
prove that the proffered reasons are a pretext for dis-
crimination. See Meinecke, 66 F.3d at 83. 
Throughout the case, the Plaintiff retains the ulti-
mate burden of persuading the finder of fact not only that 
Defendant's reasons are pretextual, but also that Defen-
dant intentionally discriminated against [*15] the Plain-
tiff. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr.. 509 U.S. at 507. Even if 
Defendant's proffered ieason is rejected, "enough evi-
dence must exist in the record for the factfinder to infer 
that discrimination was the true reason for the disparate 
treatment." Polanco v. City of Austin. Tex.. 78 F.3d 968, 
976-77 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil 
Tools. 75 F.3d 989. 994 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)). How-
ever, "'the factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put for-
ward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accom-
panied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with 
the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show 
intentional discrimination.'" Polanco. 78 F.3d at 976 
(quoting St Mary's. 113 S. Ct. at 2749). 
1. Disparate Treatment 
a. Prima Facie Case 
Defendant argues that, among other things, Plaintiff 
must establish that similarly-situated employees were 
treated more favorably in order to show a prima facie 
claim of discrimination. See Motion, at 9—10 (citing 
Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores. 891 F.2d 1177. 1180 (5th Cir. 
1990); Whitinz v. Jackson State Uniy.. 616 F.2d 116, 
120-21 (5th Cir. 1980)). Defendant argues that Plaintiff 
cannot [*16] do so, because while he has recounted ru-
mors indicating that certain male, American employees 
may have engaged in sexual harassment, he has no proof 
that these men were similarly situated to him. n3 See id. 
at 10. Plaintiff responds, arguing that the "similarly situ-
ated" standard is merely an alternative method of estab-
lishing a prima facie case, and that at any rate, Plaintiff 
has shown numerous examples of non-Canadians receiv-
ing more favored treatment. 
n3 Defendant contends that any claim of a simi-
larly situated American male would have to in-
clude allegations that: "(1) an American supervi-
sor had a harassment complaint lodged against 
him by a subordinate; (2) ARCO instructed the 
American supervisor to avoid contacting the sub-
ordinate; (3) ARCO then received unrebutted 
evidence that the American supervisor continued 
to contact the subordinate; and (4) ARCO never-
theless did not discharge the American supervi-
sor." Motion, at 10. 
Case law in this area is somewhat confused. See 
Nieto y.L&HPacking [*171 Co.. 108 F.3d 62K 623 
n.5 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Prior case law has not consistently 
applied Title VII's burden-shifting framework to the 
question of whether a similarly-situated employee out-
side the plaintiffs protected class was treated more fa-
vorably. The Supreme Court has explained that this in-
quiry is especially relevant to a showing that the em-
ployer's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 
for its decision, was pretext for discrimination. On the 
other hand, our court has held that such a showing may 
be an available avenue by which a plaintiff can establish 
& prima facie case of discrimination.") (internal citations 
omitted). It is undisputed, however, that at a minimum, 
Plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence to satisfy his 
prima facie case obligations under the more traditional 
standard: Plaintiff has established that his national origin 
is Canadian; that he was qualified for his job, that he was 
discharged, and that he was replaced by an American, 
Rodney Clements. See Response, at 19—20; see also 
Meinecke. 66 F.3d at 83: EEOC. 100 F.3d at 1180. 
Therefore, the Court will address Defendant's proffered 
reasons for termination and the summary judgment [*18] 
evidence on the ultimate issue of whether Plaintiffs ter-
mination was motivated by his national origin. 
b. Proffered Reasons and Ultimate Issue 
Defendant contends that even if Plaintiff establishes 
a prima facie case, he cannot show that ARCO's prof-
fered reasons for his termination were false, and that 
discrimination was the real reason for ARCO's action. 
Regarding the pretext inquiry, the Fifth Circuit has 
stated, " [HN6] the plaintiff cannot succeed by proving 
only that the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual. 
Rather, a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for dis-
crimination unless it is shown both that the reason was 
false, and that discrimination was the real reason." 
Walton y. Bisco Indus., Inc.. 119 F.3d 368. 370 (5th Cir. 
1997) (emphasis added). 
ARCO argues that is has established a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiffs discharge: "de-
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spite repeated counseling, second chances, and warnings 
not to contact Sweeney, unrebutted evidence showed that 
Plaintiff had nonetheless made specifically prohibited 
late-night telephone calls to [Sweeney's] home." Motion, 
at 11. 
Plaintiff has not offered any evidence demonstrating 
fact questions concerning [*19] whether ARCO's prof-
fered reason for his termination was false. Plaintiff 
merely maintains in conclusory fashion that Sweeney 
was "untruthful," and that, had ARCO verified 
Sweeney's credibility, it would have discovered that the 
police doubted her story. See Response, at 22—23. 
These arguments do not create fact questions. 
[HN7] In the context of an employer acting upon com-
plaints made by another employee, "the validity of the 
initial complaint is not the central issue, because the ul-
timate falseness of the complaint proves nothing as to the 
employer, only as to the complaining employee." 
Waggoner v. City of Garland. 987 F.2d 1160. 1165 (5th 
Cir. 1993). The relevant issue is whether ARCO termi-
nated Plaintiff because he is Canadian. See Risher v. 
Aldridze. 889 F.2d 592. 598 f5th Cir. 1995). All ARCO 
decisionmakers testified that they believed Sweeney 
brought her complaints about Plaintiff in good faith. See 
Mathera Affidavit, P 6; Anderson Affidavit, P 20; Ko-
lodziej Affidavit, P 23; Gilliam Affidavit, P 15. "ARCO 
relied on the objective evidence, confirmed by the police 
and never rebutted by Plaintiff, that Plaintiff called 
Sweeney in violation of ARCO's explicit instructions," 
[*20] Motion, at 14. 
While Plaintiff questions Sweeney's motives, and it 
appears from the record that Plaintiff and Sweeney had a 
complicated, and "mutually suspicious" relationship, see 
Response, at 5 n.6, such evidence does not implicate the 
veracity of ARCO's reason for his termination. n4 Plain-
tiff has failed to offer any evidence raising fact questions 
as to whether ARCO's reason for his termination was 
false. Accordingly, the Court now turns to the ultimate 
issue: whether discrimination was the true reason for 
Plaintiffs termination. 
n4 Nor does Plaintiffs argument that none of 
Sweeney's complaints had anything to do with 
sex or sexual harassment establish fact questions 
in this regard. 
Defendant ARCO argues that Plaintiff cannot raise 
fact issues concerning whether the real reason for Plain-
tiffs termination was that he is Canadian. Plaintiff argues 
that he has produced evidence of numerous similarly-
situated employees who were treated more favorably. He 
alleges that Jerry Goucher, an American supervisor, 
[*21] observed sexual harassment and did nothing to 
stop it. See Affidavit of Jim Canard (Exhibit 9 to Re-
sponse), P 16. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that ARCO 
took only two days to investigate Sweeney's complaints 
against Plaintiff, but took two months, before dismissing 
without investigating, Plaintiffs complaints of harass-
ment by Sweeney. 
First, ARCO maintains that Plaintiff was not fired 
following Sweeney's September 1996 complaints, re-
gardless of whether or not they are characterized as sex-
ual harassment complaints. Instead, Plaintiff was fired 
after disregarding ARCO's explicit instructions not to 
contact Sweeney at home. Thus, Plaintiffs comparisons 
to other ARCO employees who allegedly engaged in 
sexual harassment is misplaced. The uncontradicted evi-
dence is that Plaintiff was terminated for insubordination 
in refusing to comply with express company directives. 
In any event, it is undisputed that none of the deci-
sionmakers in this case are the supervisors involved in or 
even aware of the alleged sexual harassment incidents to 
which Plaintiff alludes. See Anderson Affidavit, P 21; 
Kolodziej Affidavit, P^26; Kolodziej Deposition, at 103; 
Mathera Deposition, at 31—34; Gilliam [*22] Deposi-
tion, at 18, 23. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to provide 
evidence raising fact questions that any similarly situ-
ated, alleged American harassers, were treated better 
than he was. 
Moreover, the Court concurs with ARCO that, "even 
if Plaintiff could prove that many years ago harassment 
was treated less seriously than today, that would hardly 
make it wrongful for modern management to discharge 
its legal duty to investigate and effectively respond to 
such conduct." Motion, at 12 (citing Waltman v. Interna-
tional Paver Co.. 875 F.2d 468. 479 (5th Cir. 1989)). 
Finally, because of the remoteness in time of the alleged 
incidents, such allegations constitute, at best, a scintilla 
of evidence, and are insufficient to meet Plaintiffs sum-
mary judgment burden. 
The only evidence Plaintiff offers regarding dispar-
aging comments are alleged inquiries by Kolodziej in 
1994 to see Plaintiffs green card, and about why Plaintiff 
had not become a U.S. citizen. Although ARCO denies 
these allegations, the Court will assume they are true for 
the purposes of the pending motions. The Court finds 
and concludes that the alleged remarks are not facially 
discriminatory. Plaintiff himself has had discussions 
[*23] with friends as to why he had not become a United 
States citizen. Further, Plaintiffs termination occurred 2 
1/2 years after these comments allegedly were made, and 
are at most "stray remarks." 
[HN8] Stray remarks, standing alone, are insuffi-
cient to show an indicium of discrimination Title VII. In 
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Boyd v. State Farm, plaintiff presented credible evidence 
that showed that supervisor referred to him as "Buck-
wheat." 158 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Or. 1998). The Fifth 
Circuit held that the "mere utterance of a racial epithet is 
not indicia of discrimination under Title VIL" Id. (citing 
Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co.. Inc.* 26 F.3d 
1277, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff Boyd also alleged, 
through affidavit only, that a supervisor called him a 
"porch monkey." The Fifth Circuit held that there was no 
evidence of a causal connection between the stray re-
mark and the defendant's failure to promote plaintiff. 
"Absent a causal connection between the references and 
the conduct complained of, such epithets become stray 
remarks that cannot support a discrimination verdict." Id. 
(citing Ray v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429, 434 
(5th Cir. 1995)). n5 Similarly, from the record, the [*24] 
Court discerns no causal connection between Kolodziej's 
alleged remarks, and Plaintiffs termination several years 
later. Moreover, Kolodziej was only one of several 
ARCO supervisors who made the decision to terminate 
Plaintiffs employment. Accordingly, on this record 
Plaintiff has not raised a genuine question of material 
fact regarding the ultimate issue of discrimination based 
on his Canadian nationality. n6 
n5 The Court approvingly cited Brown v. CSC 
Logic. Inc.. 82 F.3d 651. 656 (5th Cir. 1996), 
which held that specific comments over a lengthy 
period of time sufficient to establish discrimina-
tion. See Boyd, No. 97-11396, at 485 note 2. 
n6 Nor can Plaintiff sustain his summary judg-
ment burden by arguing that ARCO conducted a 
biased investigation. It is undisputed that Plaintiff 
was counseled several times before his ultimate 
termination. This again misses the point; ARCO 
terminated Plaintiff because it perceived that 
Plaintiff had violated its express orders to leave 
Sweeney alone. The fact that Vern Gilliam, 
ARCO's Human Resources Manager, admitted he 
did nothing to investigate whether Plaintiffs 
"civil rights" were violated is not pertinent to 
whether ARCO conducted a biased investigation 
of Sweeney's complaints. It is undisputed that 
ARCO verified the phone call traces from an ob-
jective, third source: the Mont Belvieu Police 
Force. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot raise fact 
questions by arguing that ARCO allegedly con-
ducted a biased investigation of his own com-
plaints. 
[*25] 
This is a case in which the employer, ARCO, gave 
its employee ample opportunity to cease offensive be-
havior and to comply with clear prophylactic directives 
to leave another employee alone and observe her interest 
in privacy. ARCO's perception that Plaintiff repeatedly 
defied the company's orders and ignored repeated warn-
ings was well-founded. Plaintiff, grasping at straws, has 
not offered evidence of any substance that would support 
a jury verdict in his favor. See Morris v. Covan World-
wide Moving Inc.. 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998) 
("Once the moving party presents the district court with a 
properly supported summary judgment motion, the bur-
den shifts to the nonmoving party to show that summary 
judgment is inappropriate."). Summary judgment is war-
ranted dismissing Plaintiffs TCHRA claim. 
c. Mixed Motive Analysis 
In his response, Plaintiff makes an obscure reference 
to the "mixed motive" standard in Title VII cases, and 
argues that "Plaintiff need only show that national origin 
was a 'motivating' factor in ARCO's decision to dis-
charge him." Response, at 23. Defendant ARCO does not 
appear to respond to this argument, but the Court will 
address it in an exercise of [*26] caution. 
[HN9] "The fundamental prerequisite to the mixed-
motives instruction is the presentation of direct evidence 
of discrimination." Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co.* 54 
F.3d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1995). "Direct evidence" is 
"evidence which if believed, proves the fact [of discrimi-
natory animus] without inference or presumption." Id. 
(citing Brown v. East Mississippi Elec. Power Ass'n% 989 
F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original) n7 ). 
n7 The Court in Brown held: 
When a plaintiff presents credible 
direct evidence mat discriminatory 
animus in part motivated or was a 
substantial factor in the contested 
employment action, the burden of 
proof shifts to the employer to es-
tablish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the same decision 
would have been made regardless 
of the forbidden factor. Direct evi-
dence is evidence which, if be-
lieved, proves the fact without in-
ference or presumption. 
Brown* 989 F.2dat 861. 
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Plaintiff argues that he "has raised numerous fact is-
sues which [*27] demonstrate that the key decision-
maker, Eric Kolodziej, was motivated by his resentment 
of Plaintiffs national origin." Response, at 23. Plaintiff 
claims Kolodziej's resentment was evidence because he 
demanded to see Plaintiffs green card, asked Plaintiff 
why he had not become an American, and failed to disci-
pline an employee who complained of a "fucking for-
eigner." See id. The Court determines that these com-
ments do not rise to the level of direct evidence of dis-
crimination. While "a supervisor's open and routine use 
of. . . slurs" may constitute direct evidence of an imper-
missible motivating factor," Kolodziej's statements do 
not prove the fact of discrimination without inference or 
presumption. As noted above, the inquiry was years be-
fore Plaintiffs offending conduct and the remarks were 
not inherently racially discriminatory or antagonistic to 
foreigners, or Canadians. "The offending comments [can 
be] reasonably interpreted as [something] other that a 
reflection of bias . . . ." Moonev. 54 F.3d at 1217. 
Because Plaintiff has failed to show fact questions 
regarding direct evidence of discrimination, the burden 
does not shift to ARCO to show that it would have made 
[*28] the same decision in the absence of discriminatory 
motive. Plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment on 
his Title VII claim on a mixed-motive analysis. 
2. Hostile Environment 
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed to 
meet his burden on any hostile environment claim: De-
fendant argues that Plaintiffs hostile environment claim 
is barred because it cannot reasonably be construed as 
growing out of his charge of discrimination, that it is 
barred by the statute of limitations, and also that Plain-
tiffs allegations do not rise to the level of hostile envi-
ronment. Plaintiff counters that his hostile environment 
claims were timely raised, that his charge refers to a 
"continuing pattern" of discrimination, and that fact 
questions exist supporting his hostile environment claim. 
a. Administrative Exhaustion 
[HN10] A Title VII (or, by inference, a TCHRA) 
action may be based upon claims that "could reasonably 
be expected to grow out of the initial charges of dis-
crimination." The Fifth Circuit recently held: 
The filing of an administrative complaint 
is ordinarily a jurisdictional prerequisite 
to a Title VII action. Ray v. Freeman, 
626 F.2d 439. 442 (5th Or. 1980). [*29] 
cert denied, 450 U.S. 997. 68 L. Ed. 2d 
198. 101 S. Ct. 1701 (1981). . . . A Title 
VII cause of action may be based, not 
only upon the specific complaints made 
by the employee's initial EEOC charge, 
but also upon any kind of discrimination 
like or related to the charge's allegations, 
limited only by the scope of the EEOC 
investigation that could reasonably be ex-
pected to grow out of the initial charges of 
discrimination. Fine v. GAF Chemical 
Corp.. 995 F.2d 576. 578 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(quoting Fellows v. Universal Restau-
rants. Inc.. 701 F.2d 447. 451 (5th Cir.), 
cert denied, 464 U.S. 828. 78 L. Ed. 2d 
106. 104 S.Ct. 102(1983)). 
Dollis v. Rubin. 11 F.3d 777. 781 (5th Cir. 1995). 
ARCO argues that Plaintiff never alleged that 
ARCO had subjected him to a hostile work environment 
in his TCHRA charge of discrimination. Plaintiff re-
sponds that "the hostile work environment issues raised 
by Plaintiff are directly related to his national origin dis-
crimination complaint and are not barred. Plaintiff 
checked the box for national origin discrimination in his 
TCHRA and EEOC charge. . . . Plaintiffs charge refers 
to a continuing pattern of discrimination based on un-
equal [*30] treatment and a pervasive environment such 
as derogatory comments such as 'dumb ass Canadian.'" 
Response, at 26. The scope of the claims Plaintiff in-
tended to assert is not entirely clear from his charge. 
Plaintiff did allege: "During my employment with 
ARCO, I was called a 'dumb ass Canadian* and foreigner 
by supervisors and fellow employees . . . ." Charge of 
Discrimination (Exhibit 28 to Response). The charge 
should be construed broadly. See Clark v. Kraft Foods, 
Inc.. 18 F.3d 1278. 1280 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994) ("liberal 
construction [is] accorded EEOC charges, especially 
those by unlawyered complainants'") (quoting Fellows v. 
Universal Restaurants. Inc.. 701 F.2d 447. 451 (5th Cir. 
1983)). Thus, construing all doubts in favor of Plaintiff, 
the Court finds that Plaintiffs sparse allegations could 
reasonably have led to an EEOC investigation into a hos-
tile environment claim. 
b. Statute of Limitations 
[HN11] A plaintiff must file an EEOC charge 
within 180 days after the allegedly discriminatory inci-
dent in order to recover damages arising from that inci-
dent. See 42U.S.C. 8 2000e-5(e)(l). 
Defendant argues that "Plaintiff has not cited one 
specific instance of alleged [*31] national origin har-
assment within the limitations period-that is, within 180 
days before the filing of his TCHRA charge in 1997." 
Reply, at 9. Plaintiff counters that his charge was filed 
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within the time limits of the last discriminatory act, 
which was the termination of Plaintiff on December 2, 
1996. This evidence, however, is insufficient. Plaintiffs 
termination was an act of allegedly disparate treatment, 
separate and discrete from the alleged harassing conduct. 
Therefore, none of the alleged national origin harassment 
alleged by Plaintiff occurred within the actionable limita-
tions period. Plaintiffs Title VII harassment claim thus is 
time-barred. 
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Defendant ARCO argues that Plaintiff cannot pre-
vail on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress because the alleged conduct does not rise to a 
legally actionable level, because certain of the comments 
by Kolodziej are time-barred, and because ARCO cannot 
be held liable for Sweeney's alleged misconduct. Plaintiff 
responds with a litany of statements and conduct that he 
alleges rise above the level of ordinary employment dis-
putes, n8 however, he does not address [*32] ARCO's 
limitations and agency arguments. 
n8 Plaintiff recites the following as evidence of 
fact questions regarding intentional infliction of 
emotional distress: Kolodziej falsely accused 
Plaintiff of sexually harassing Sweeney; Kolod-
ziej falsely accused Plaintiff of "balling" 
Sweeney; Kolodziej falsely accused Plaintiff of 
being insane, delusional and irrational; Kolodziej 
prepared a letter demoting Plaintiff without first 
consulting Plaintiff; Kolodziej falsely accused 
Plaintiff of creating a hostile work environment; 
Kolodziej laughed at Plaintiff and told him he 
had no legal rights; Gilliam promised a full inves-
tigation, but allegedly performed no investiga-
tion; Kolodziej asked to see Plaintiffs green card; 
Kolodziej asked why Plaintiff had not become a 
citizen after 20 years; Kolodziej referred to Plain-
tiff as "Dad," and refused to refer to him by his 
first name; Anderson told Plaintiff he had no le-
gal rights; ARCO failed to take action when 
Plaintiff complained that Sweeney was spreading 
lies about him; ARCO accepted Sweeney's com-
plaints and concluded Plaintiff was guilty without 
consulting Plaintiff; Sweeney exposed her nude 
body to Plaintiff; Sweeney enticed Plaintiff into 
lending her thousands of dollars with no intention 
of paying him back; and Sweeney spread false-
hoods about Plaintiff. See Response, at 35-36. 
[*33] [HN12] 
In order to recover damages for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, Plaintiff must prove the following: 
(1) Defendants acted intentionally or reck-
lessly; 
(2) Defendants' conduct was extreme and 
outrageous; 
(3) Defendants' actions caused Plaintiff 
emotional distress; and, 
(4) the resulting emotional distress was 
severe. 
Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.. 95 F.3d 396% 
400 (5th Cir. 1996); MacArthur v. University of Texas 
Health Center. 45 F.3d 890, 898 (5th Cir. 1995): 
Danawala v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.. 14 F.3d 
25 K 256 (5th Cir. 1993): Twvman v. Twvman. 855 
S.W.2d 619. 621-22 (Tex. 1993). Liability 4ox outra-
geous conduct "should be found 'only where the conduct 
has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in 
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, 
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in 
a civilized community.'" Twvman. 855 S.W.2d at 621 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)); 
accord MacArthur. 45 F.3d at 898. n9 
n9 See Burden v. General Dynamics Corp.. 60 
F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1995) (summary judgment for 
employer on claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress affirmed, rejecting Plaintiffs 
allegations that, despite his excellent job per-
formance, he suffered humiliation and health 
problems when he was reclassified to an isolated 
position, he was given no input into critical man-
agement decisions, he was ostracized and given 
menial assignments, and his office and secretary 
were taken away); Johnson v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals. Inc.. 965 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 
1992) (summary judgment for employer on claim 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress af-
firmed, despite allegations that Plaintiff was told 
that he did not "fit in" with the company, and that 
his supervisor was extremely hostile, constandy 
criticized him, threatened him with termination, 
reassigned his sales territory and removed a sale 
from his credits). Cf. Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie 
Asphalt Co.. 990 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(calling employee "Mexican" or "wetback" does 
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not support claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress). 
[*34] [HN13] 
An employer's conduct, even if a Title VII violation, 
rises to the level of extreme and outrageous in only the 
most unusual cases. See Hirras* 95 F.3d at 400 (citing 
Prunty v. Arkansas Freightways, Inc., 16 F.3d 649, 654 
(5th Cir. 1994)). Complaints that fall within the realm of 
an ordinary employment dispute do not suffice for a 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See 
Johnson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc.. 965 F.2d 
3h 33-34 (5th Cir. 1992). 
While some of Kolodziej's and Sweeney's nlO al-
leged misconduct may have been inappropriate or insen-
sitive, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to 
allege any facts sufficient to sustain his summary judg-
ment burden on this intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim against Defendant ARCO. The alleged 
conduct simply is not "so extreme in degree, as to go 
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be re-
garded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community.'" Twyman. 855 S.W.2d at 621 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)). 
Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on this 
claim. 
nlO For a discussion of ARCO's liability for 
Sweeney's alleged conduct, see infra Part III.C.l 
andIII.C.3. 
[•35] 
C. Defamation and Slander Claims 
Plaintiffs defamation claims are based on alleged 
statements made by Sweeney and Kolodziej. Plaintiff 
contends Kolodziej defamed him by stating that Plaintiff 
was "balling" Sweeney and was a liar; ni l Plaintiff also 
maintains that Kolodziej said Plaintiff was insane, delu-
sional, and irrational. nl2 See Plaintiffs Fourth Amended 
Petition (Exhibit W to Motion) ("Petition") P 23. Plain-
tiff claims that Sweeney defamed him by claiming, inter 
alia, that he stalked her, had sex with her, spied on her, 
broke into her home, damaged her home, stole from her 
purse, stole her answering machine, hid in her bushes, 
damaged her property, threatened to kill her, and was 
obsessed with her. See id. PP 20-23. 
[*36] 
n i l Plaintiff made the "liar" allegations in his 
Answers and Objections to Defendant ARCO 
Chemical Company's First Interrogatories to 
Plaintiff [Exhibit T to Motion] ("Answers and 
Objections"), Interrogatory No. 19. Illustrative of 
Plaintiffs allegations are the following: 
1. By falsely telling Plaintiff that 
all the people on the shift have 
complained about me, and when I 
ask the people and they deny even 
talking to Eric, me going back to 
Eric with this-then Eric going 
around to each individual and tell-
ing them that I over-reacted and 
that he is happy with the produc-
tivity of the shift—he is calling me 
a liar and telling the people of my 
shift that I do not know what I am 
talking about.—Yet he uses this 
material in my review as fact. 
8. By denying he asked to see my 
"green card", is calling me a liar. 
9. By denying he asked me to ex-
plain why I was in the United 
State[s] for twenty year [sic] and 
had yet to become an American 
Citizen—is calling me a liar. 
Answers and Objections, at 25—26. 
nl2 These claims were asserted by Plaintiff in his 
First Supplemental Pleading [Doc. # 15] ("Sup-
plemental Pleading"), which states that on Janu-
ary 23, 1998, Kolodziej stated to ARCO em-
ployee James Sullivan ("Sullivan") that plaintiff 
was insane, delusional, and irrational. See Sup-
plemental Pleading, PP 5-6. Plaintiff also claims 
that since January 23, 1998, Kolodziej repeatedly 
stated to ARCO employees in Pennsylvania and 
Texas that Plaintiff was insane, delusional, and ir-
rational. See id. P 7. Plaintiff could not identify 
anyone other than Sullivan in Pennsylvania to 
whom Kolodziej made the alleged comments, nor 
did he present evidence that Kolodziej made the 
remarks to anyone in Texas. See Martineau 
Deposition, at 467, 506, 508-09, 511, 513-15, 
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516. Accordingly, the Court addresses only the 
statements allegedly made to Sullivan. 
Defendant ARCO argues that Plaintiffs defamation 
claims fail as a matter of law because ARCO is not liable 
for Sweeney's or Kolodziej's alleged statements, and 
because Kolodziej's statements are not actionable defa-
mation. Plaintiff responds that [*37] material fact issues 
remains on his defamation claims. 
1. ARCO's Liability for Employee Statements 
In Texas, [HN14] "an action is sustainable against a 
corporation for defamation by its agent, if such defama-
tion is referable to the duty owing by the agent to the 
corporation, and was made while in the discharge of that 
duty. Neither express authorization nor subsequent ratifi-
cation is necessary to establish liability." Wagner v. 
Caprock Beef Packers Co.. 540 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Tex. 
1976). 
Plaintiff argues that "Kolodziej's slander is sustain-
able against ARCO, because the defamation was made 
while Kolodziej was discharging his duty to ARCO to 
damage Plaintiffs reputation and to keep witnesses from 
testifying against ARCO." Response, at 29. While Ko-
lodziej's communications with John Sullivan were insen-
sitive, the comments either fall into the general category 
of unauthorized gossip or mere personal opinion. See 
Affidavit of John Sullivan (Exhibit 36 to Response) 
("Sullivan Affidavit"). Plaintiff has offered no summary 
judgment evidence that Kolodziej's job duties or work 
relationship to Plaintiff required discussions or specula-
tion about his sex life or her uninformed personal [*38] 
opinion about Plaintiffs psychological mental state. In 
fact, Plaintiff admits that he has no evidence indicating 
that Kolodziej's job tasks included the alleged name call-
ing. See Martineau Deposition, at 489 ("I doubt if it 
would be within his job duties. I don't know what his 
duties of what his function is or what he's supposed to 
do."). 
Moreover, it is well established that [HN15] unau-
thorized gossip of employees or supervisors cannot be 
imputed to an employer. See Danawala v. Houston 
Lwhtinv & Power Co.. 14 F.3d 251. 255 (5th Cir, 1993) 
(employer not responsible for "unauthorized gossip" 
spread by co-workers); Patton v. United Parcel Serv.. 
Inc.. 910 F. Supp. 1250. 1274 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (same); 
Marshall Fields Stores. Inc. v. Gardiner. 859 S.W.2d 
39L 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dis-
m'd w.o.j.) (same). Plaintiff has simply offered no evi-
dence—as opposed to Plaintiffs personal conclusions—to 
establish genuine fact issues concerning whether and 
how Kolodziej's duties to ARCO were to be advanced by 
him making the allegedly defamatory statements about 
Plaintiff. See Randall's. 891 S.W.2d 640. 647 (employee 
acted independently and outside scope of [*39] authority 
when publishing statements to store's customers); Seifert. 
567 S.W.2d 77, 78 (affirming summary judgment for 
employer because employee acting outside scope of em-
ployment when he made defamatory statements); 
Wazner. 540 S.W.2d at 304-05 (employer not liable 
because manager "not about his employer's business" 
when making phone calls spreading defamatory state-
ments). 
As to Sweeney, Plaintiff maintains that he has 
"raised genuine issues of material fact that Lisa Sweeney, 
an ARCO employee defamed him, in the course and 
scope of her employment." Response, at 28. As in the 
case of Kolodziej, however, Plaintiff has not offered 
competent summary judgment evidence establishing fact 
issues regarding whether Sweeney's alleged statements 
were made as part of her duties to ARCO. nl3 Plaintiffs 
conclusory assertions based on his own self-interested 
personal opinion are insufficient to raise a genuine fact 
question in this context. 
nl3 Plaintiff argues that Sweeney admitted that 
she was acting in the course and scope of her em-
ployment at all times relevant to the lawsuit. De-
fendant notes correctly, however, that ARCO is 
not bound by Sweeney's admissions. As noted, 
supra, it is undisputed that the rumors Sweeney 
allegedly was spreading were unauthorized 
workplace gossip that as a matter of law cannot 
be imputed to employers. 
[*40] 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs defamation claims cannot 
survive summary judgment on this ground. 
2. Merits of Kolodziej's Alleged Defamatory 
Statements 
In the alternative, ARCO argues that even if it were 
liable for its employee Kolodziej's statements, the claim 
fail for a variety of reasons. 
a. The Alleged "Balling" and Various "Liar" 
Comments 
In its Motion, Defendant ARCO moved to dismiss 
the alleged "balling" and "liar" comments. Plaintiff did 
not respond to these arguments, and appears to have 
abandoned these claims. See Response, at 10 n.2. Plain-
tiff only addresses his new, supplemental claims. Ac-
cordingly, Plaintiff has not met his summary judgment 
burden as to these allegations, and dismissal is appropri-
ate. nl4 Accordingly, summary judgment must be 
granted on this defamation claim. 
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n!4 Even if Plaintiff had responded to Defen-
dant's arguments, it is unlikely that his claims 
would have survived summary judgment. Plain-
tiff claims that Kolodziej made the "balling" 
statement in April 1996, when the two men were 
alone in Plaintiffs office. See Martineau Deposi-
tion, at 265-67, 269. Plaintiff admits that Kolod-
ziej never repeated the statement, and has no evi-
dence that Kolodziej made the remark to anyone 
else. See id. at 265-67. 
In Texas, [HN16] libel and slander claims must 
be brought within a year of the accrual of those 
claims. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 16.002 fa) (Vernon 1986); Ross v. Ark-
wrizht Mut Ins. Co.. 892 S.W.2d 119. 131-32 
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1994, no writ). 
Accrual occurs on the date of communication, not 
its consequences. See Ross. 892 S.W.2d at 131-
32. Plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until June 11, 
1997, well past the statute of limitations deadline. 
Therefore, any claim for the alleged "balling" 
statement is now time-barred. Moreover, Plaintiff 
admits that the alleged comment was made to 
Plaintiff while the men were alone in Plaintiffs 
office. "Slander is a defamatory statement that is 
orally communicated or published to a third per-
son without legal excuse." Randalls. 891 S.W.2d 
at 646 (emphasis added). 
As for the alleged "liar" comments, Defendant ar-
ticulated many compelling reasons why the 
statements would not be defamatory, including: 
the statute of limitations bars some statements; 
many are not capable of defamatory meaning; 
there is no evidence of publication to third par-
ties; many are statements of opinion. While the 
Court need not and does not reach a conclusion 
on the merits of these claims, the Court simply 
observes in passing that their legal viability is 
doubtful. 
[*41] 
b. Plaintiffs Supplemental Slander Claims 
Plaintiff contends that Kolodziej told Sullivan that 
Plaintiff was insane, irrational, and delusional. Defendant 
ARCO, in its Supplemental Motion, argues that summary 
judgment must be granted on these issues because: the 
alleged statements are opinions; the alleged statements 
are not defamatory; the alleged statements are privileged; 
and Texas does not recognize compelled self-publication. 
Fact vs. Opinion.—A [HN17] statement is defama-
tory if the words tend to injure a person's reputation, ex-
posing the person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or 
financial injury. See Baldwin v. University of Texas 
Medical Branch at Galveston. 945 F. Supp. 1022, 1035 
(S.D. Tex. 1996), affdy 122 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1997): 
Schauer v. Memorial Care Systems. 856 S.W.2d 437% 
446 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1993, no writ); 
Einhorn v. LaChance. 823 S.W.2d 405, 410-11 (Tex. 
App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1992, writ dismM w.o.j.). 
Whether a document or statement is reasonably capable 
of a defamatory meaning is an issue of law for the court. 
See Baldwin. 945 F. Supp. at 1034-35; Musser v. Smith 
Protective Services. Inc.. f*42] 723 S.W.2d 653, 654-55 
(Tex. 1987). "All assertions of opinion are protected by 
the first amendment of the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution." Carr 
v. Brasher. 116 S.W.2d 567. 570 Hex. 1989). Thus, an 
essential element of a defamation cause of action is that 
the alleged defamatory statement be a statement of fact 
rather than opinion. See Howell v. Hecht. 821 S.W.2d 
627, 631 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied); AJjL 
Belo Corp. v. Rayzor. 644 S.W.2d 71, 79 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1982, writ refd n.r.e.). Whether a statement 
is an opinion or an assertion of fact is also a question of 
law. nl5 See Carr. 116 S.W.2d at 570. 
nl5 The Texas appellate court in Yiamouyiannis 
listed helpful factors in making the fact/opinion 
determination: 
[HN18] 
In distinguishing between fact and 
opinion, the court should (1) ana-
lyze the common usage of the spe-
cific language to determine 
whether it has a precise, well un-
derstood core of meaning that 
conveys facts, or whether the 
statement is indefinite and am-
biguous; (2) assess the statement's 
verifiability, that is, whether it is 
objectively capable of being 
proven true or false; (3) consider 
the entire context of the article or 
column, including cautionary lan-
guage; and (4) evaluate the kind of 
writing or speech as to its presen-
tation as commentary or "hard" 
news. 750 F.2d at 978-84. This in-
quiry should help determine, for 
example, whether the statement is 
to be taken as precise and literal or 
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loose and figurative, and whether 
the language is employed as meta-
phor or hyperbole, or to convey 
actual facts. 
Yiamouyiannis. 764 S.W.2d 338, 341 (relying on 
the four-part test set forth in Oilman v. Evans. 
242 U.S. APP. D C 301. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 
1984)). This test has been adopted by several 
Texas courts. See, e.g., Yiamouyiannis v. Thomp-
son. 764 S.W.2d 338. 341 (Tex. App.-San Anto-
nio 1989, no writ); El Paso Times, Inc. v. Kerr, 
706 S.W.2d 797. 798 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1986, 
writ ref d n.r.e.). The Texas Supreme Court, how-
ever, has not adopted these factors. See Carr. 776 
S.W.2d at 570. 
[*43] 
Having reviewed the record, and the context in 
which Kolodziej's statements allegedly were made, the 
Court determines that Plaintiff complains of non-
actionable opinions. As Defendant argues, the words 
were used in a figurative, rather than literal, sense. Plain-
tiff has proffered no evidence that Kolodziej used the 
terms literally, and it is undisputed that Kolodziej had no 
professional training that would enable him to make a 
professional evaluation. See Kolodziej Affidavit, P 6; 
Martineau Deposition, at 496-98, 531-32. In fact, Sulli-
van characterized Kolodziej's remarks as "views." See 
Martineau Deposition, at 533; Sullivan Affidavit, P 4. 
Finally, as Defendant notes, words such as those alleg-
edly used by Kolodziej commonly are used hyperboli-
cally, rather than literally, and as such express opinion 
instead of fact. Cf. Yiamouyuannis. 1(A S.W.2d at 341 
(remarks that plaintiff was a "quack," "hoke artist," and 
"fear monger," were "vintage hyperbole" and "pure opin-
ion"); Einhorn v. LaChance. 823 S.W.2d 405. 412 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [1st Dist] 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (de-
scriptions of plaintiff as "incompetent, troublemakers 
and liars" absolutely privileged opinions). [*44] 
Accordingly, even if the Court found that liability 
for Kolodziej's alleged statements could be imputed to 
Defendant ARCO, the Court concludes that the remarks 
in question were merely opinion, and therefore subject to 
privilege. nl6 Summary judgment is therefore appropri-
ate on this alternative ground on PlaintifTs supplemental 
slander claims. 
nl6 Additionally, Defendant ARCO raised and 
briefed several other strong arguments for dis-
missal of this claim, including: the statements 
were not reasonably capable of defamatory mean-
ing and the statements were subject to a qualified 
privilege. 
Slander Per Se.--In his Supplemental Response, 
Plaintiff also argues that Kolodziej's alleged statements 
were slander per se. 
[HN19] "Statements are slanderous per se if they 
are so obviously harmful to the person harmed that no 
proof of their injurious effect is necessary to make them 
actionable. Matters characterized as slanderous per se are 
statements that affect a person injuriously in his office, 
profession, [*45] or occupation." Simmons v. Ware. 920 
S.W.2d 438, 451 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ) 
(citations omitted). The Simmons court explained: 
In determining whether a statement is ac-
tionable, the statements in their entirety 
must be examined. They must be con-
strued as a whole in light of the surround-
ing circumstances and judged as a person 
of ordinary intelligence would perceive 
them. It is only if the statements are am-
biguous or of doubtful import that a jury 
is called upon to determine their meaning 
and effect upon an ordinary person. 
Id. 
Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes 
that, for the reasons stated supra, no reasonable person 
would perceive Kolodziej's alleged statements as slan-
derous per se. Accordingly, PlaintifTs slander claim can-
not survive summary judgment on this ground. 
3. Ratification of Sweeney's Statements 
Plaintiff further claims that ARCO is responsible for 
Sweeney's alleged comments because it ratified them. 
Plaintiff claims that ARCO managers were made aware 
of Sweeney's comments on four different occasions, but 
failed to take any action to stop the defamation. n!7 
n!7 Plaintiff states: 
In mid to late August 1996, Plain-
tiff told Sammy Durett, the shift 
superintendent and Eric Kolodziej, 
his immediate supervisor, that 
Sweeney had been "bad-
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mouthing" for four to five months 
and he wanted this stopped. In 
September 1996, Plaintiff com-
plained to Kolodziej and Jetola 
Anderson, the human resources 
representative, that he had heard 
from plan operators that he was 
demoted for sexual harassment 
and that Sweeney was continuing 
to bad mouth him. In late Septem-
ber 1996, Plaintiff told Kolodziej 
and Anderson that he heard from 
lab technicians that Sweeney said 
the following falsehoods about 
him: 1) He broke into Sweeney's 
home 2) He damaged her home 3) 
He stole out of her purse 4) He 
stalked her and 5) He was ob-
sessed with her. He again asked 
that something be done to stop the 
spreading of these lies. In early 
October 1996, Plaintiff again 
complained to Kolodziej and 
Anderson about the specific false-
hoods that were being said about 
him and asked that they be 
stopped. 
Response, at 30—31. Sweeney confirms that she 
was instructed in the October meeting not to gos-
sip about Plaintiff. See Sweeney Deposition, at 
148. 
[*46] [HN20] 
"Ratification may occur when the employer . . . con-
firms, adopts, or fails to repudiate that acts of its em-
ployee." Prunty v, Arkansas Freightways. Inc.* 16 F.3d 
649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Moreover, 
"when the company 1) knows about the employee's acts, 
2) recognizes that the employee's acts will continue is he 
is retained, 3) does nothing to prevent the ongoing tor-
tious acts, and 4) chooses to retain the employee, the 
company ratifies the tortious acts . . . . " Id. at 654. 
ARCO argues that it cannot be liable based on its 
failure to repudiate Sweeney's acts. Even assuming 
ARCO had knowledge of Sweeney's comments, nl8 the 
summary judgment evidence indicates no likelihood that 
Sweeney's comments would continue if she were re-
tained. The company took action in October 1996. Both 
Kolodziej and Anderson instructed Sweeney to refrain 
from discussing the matter with other ARCO employees. 
See Anderson Affidavit, P 13; Kolodziej Affidavit, P 14. 
Moreover, in response to Plaintiffs complaints, ARCO 
instructed Sweeney unambiguously in an October meet-
ing not to gossip about Plaintiff. See Sweeney Deposi-
tion, at 202-03. Plaintiff has proffered no evidence dis-
puting [*47] these facts. Instead, he claims that he com-
plained about Sweeney in "mid to late" August and in 
September of 1996, yet to his knowledge, nothing was 
done at that time. ARCO denies this claim, but in any 
event, these facts are insufficient to raise a summary 
judgment issue as to ratification. nl9 Six weeks is not an 
unreasonable time period for an employer to investigate 
a complex situation as the one Plaintiff and Sweeney 
presented. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demon-
strate the existence of fact issues regarding ARCO's al-
leged ratification of Sweeney's statements. 
nl8 ARCO maintains that it had no actual knowl-
edge of Sweeney's alleged acts. It is undisputed 
that the original statements were not made on 
ARCO's behalf. 
nl9 Moreover, Plaintiff admitted that his alleged 
complaints of August and September 1996 re-
garded alleged "rumors" and "bad mouthing" that 
he wanted ARCO to "put an end to." Martineau 
Deposition, at 337. As discussed, supra, employ-
ers are not responsible for workplace rumors or 
gossip. Plaintiff further admits that he did not 
complain about specific alleged statements until 
October 1996, when ARCO warned Sweeney not 
to spread allegations. 
[*48] 
4. ARCO's Liability for Self-Publication or Re-
Publication 
Plaintiff finally argues that ARCO is liable under the 
legal theory of "self-defamation" or "compelled republi-
cation," relying on two intermediate Texas appellate 
courts that held that an employer may be liable for the 
employee's own publication of the employer's defama-
tory statements under certain circumstances. See First 
State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake. 606 S.W.2d 696, 
701-02 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd 
n.r.e.); Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico. 696 S.W.2d 439, 
446 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ refd n.r.e.). 
ARCO counters that the Texas Supreme Court has never 
recognized these theories, citing Lyle v. Waddle, 144 
Tex. 90. 188S.W.2d770. 772 (Tex. 1945). 
Plaintiff claims in his Supplemental Pleading that 
"he has had to repeat [Kolodziej's] defamatory state-
ments to prospective employers and to family and 
friends, causing further damage through self-
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defamation." Supplemental Pleading, P 14. Plaintiff ad-
mitted in deposition, inconsistent with his pleading, that 
he has not repeated the alleged statements to any pro-
spective employers. See Martineau Deposition, at 533. 
The Court finds [*49] and concludes that even if the 
Texas Supreme Court were to adopt this theory, Plaintiff 
could not meet the requirements for this cause of action. 
The two cases cited by Plaintiff both rely upon "com-
ment m" to S 557 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS. See First State Bank. 606 S.W.2d at 701: 
Chasewood Constr. Co.. 696 S.W.2d 439. 446. The Re-
statement requires the defamed person to show that when 
he published the remark, (1) he was unaware of the de-
famatory nature of the statement, n20 and (2) circum-
stances indicated that the communication to the third 
party would be likely. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 557 cmt. m; Doe v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp.. 855 S.W.2d 248. 259 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993), 
affd as modified on other grounds, 903 S.W.2d 347, 356 
(Tex. 1995). Plaintiff does not claim that he was unaware 
of the defamatory nature of the alleged statement, nor 
does he offer evidence indicating any lack of awareness. 
n20 The Ahe and Rico courts omit the first Re-
statement requirement: that the defamed persons 
demonstrate that he was unaware of the defama-
tory nature of the matter. See Ake. 606 S.W.2d at 
IQURico. 696 S.W.2d at 446. As another appel-
late court has noted, however, this first require-
ment is essential because otherwise "the defamed 
party is under no duty to mitigate its damages by 
refraining to self-publish known defamatory 
statements." Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.. 
855 S.W.2d 248. 259 (Tex. App.-Austin), affd 
as modified on other grounds, 903 S.W.2d 347, 
356 (Tex. 1995) 
[*50] 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs defamation claims cannot 
survive summary judgment on the theory of self-
publication or re-publication. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes 
that Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
[Doc. # 17], and Defendant ARCO Chemical Company's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Supple-
mental Slander Claim [Doc. # 29], are GRANTED in 
their entirety. Plaintiff has failed to raise genuine ques-
tions of material fact concerning essential elements of his 
Title VII claims, his intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim, and his defamation claims. It is therefore 
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment [Doc. # 17], and Defendant ARCO 
Chemical Company's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Slander Claim [Doc. # 29] are 
GRANTED. 
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 23d day of Decem-
ber, 1998. 
NANCY F. ATLAS 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
For the reasons stated in this Court's Memorandum 
and Order, dated December 23d 1998, this civil action is 
DISMISSED. 
This is a final judgment. 
The Clerk will enter [*51] this Order and provide 
all parties with a true copy. 
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 23d day of Decem-
ber, 1998. 
NANCY F. ATLAS 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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March 13,1991 
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] 
Appeal from Judgment Entered in the Common Pleas 
Court; County of Summit, Ohio; Case No. 88 4 1236. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiffs, employee and 
spouse, appealed a judgment from the Common Pleas 
Court, Summit County (Ohio), which granted summary 
judgment in favor of defendants, employer and investiga-
tors, on claims of defamation, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, negligent investigation, and loss of 
services and consortium. 
OVERVIEW: The employee was fired for sexually har-
assing another employee and was denied unemployment 
benefits. He contended that the investigation was con-
ducted in an outrageous and negligent manner. The court 
affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judg-
ment to the employer and investigators. The trial court, 
in finding that the employee's bare assertions failed to 
rebut the motion adequately, as required by Ohio R. Civ. 
P. 56(E), did not place the initial burden upon the em-
ployee. The record did not support the claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. As to the defama-
tion claim, the employee failed to set forth specific facts 
showing that statements to co-workers were made in 
furtherance of the employer's business. Moreover, an 
employer was not liable for an employee's intentional, 
malicious torts performed outside the scope of employ-
ment. Ohio law did not recognize a tort of negligent in-
vestigation of an employee's misconduct. 
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the summary judgment 
in favor of the employer and investigators. 
CORE TERMS: summary judgment, chandler, cause of 
action, sexual harassment, assignments of error, nonmov-
ing party, assignment of error, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, granting summary judgment, moving 
party, defamation, consortium, properly granted, further-
ance, co-workers, bare, journal entry, infliction of emo-
tional distress, genuine issue of material fact, summary 
judgment motion, allegedly defamatory, entitled to 
judgment, burden of proof, genuine issue, material fact, 
matter of law, court erred, flirtatious, outrageous, deposi-
tions 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Civil Procedure > Discovery > Methods > General 
Overview 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Motions for 
Summary Judgment > General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Time Limita-
tions 
[HN1] Pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 56(C). a party's mo-
tion for summary judgment shall be granted if, constru-
ing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, the pleading, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of 
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evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of 
fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to a ay material fact and that the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 
burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists rests with the moving party. However, Rule 56(E) 
provides that when a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported by evidence as provided in the rule, 
the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts show-
ing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Appellate Re-
view > General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Motions for 
Summary Judgment > (General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De 
Novo Review 
[HN2] In reviewing a summary judgment, both trial and 
appellate courts adopt the same standard. Both courts 
construe the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-
moving party. Pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 56(C), a re-
viewing court will affirm the trial court's grant of sum-
mary judgment if it finds that: (1) No genuine issues as 
to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and 
(3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds 
can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evi-
dence most strongly in favor of the party against whom 
the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclu-
sion is adverse to that panrty. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Preserva-
tion for Review 
Torts > Negligence > Actions > Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress > General Overview 
[HN3] The appellate court need not address any issue 
which was not first raised in the trial court. 
Torts > Intentional Torts > Defamation > General 
Overview 
Torts > Vicarious Liability > Employers > General 
Overview 
[HN4] Under respondeat superior, the test of an em-
ployer's liability for an employee's allegedly defamatory 
statements is not simply whether the employee was in its 
employ, but whether the statements were made in the 
furtherance of the employer's business and under the 
general direction of the employer. 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Har-
assment > Sexual Harassment > Employer Liability > 
Coworkers 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Har-
assment > Sexual Harassment > Employment Practices 
> Discharges & Failures to Hire 
Torts > Vicarious Liability > Employers > Activities & 
Conditions > Intentional Torts 
[HN5] In Ohio, an employer is not liable for an em-
ployee's intentional, malicious torts performed outside 
the scope of employment 
Torts > Business Torts > Negligent Hiring & Supervi-
sion 
[HN6] Negligent investigation of an employee's miscon-
duct is not a cause of action recognized in Ohio law. 
COUNSEL: 
JOHN L. WOLFE, Attorney at Law, Akron, Ohio, 
for Plaintiffs. 
GREGORY L. HAMMOND, Attorney at Law, Ak-
ron, Ohio, for Defendants. 
JUDGES: 
William R. Baird, for the court. Quillin, P. J., Ca-
cioppo, J., concur. 
OPINION BY: 
BAIRD 
OPINION: 
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial 
court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the 
following disposition is made: 
This cause comes before the court upon the appeal 
of Perry and Annette Lamson from the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor the defendant-
appellees, Firestone Tire & Rubber Company (Fire-
stone), Charles Ramsey, Jr., and Jacqueline C. Steese. 
We affirm. 
Perry Lamson was employed by Firestone as a secu-
rity guard from June 24, 1968, to April 28, 1986. He was 
fired by Firestone for sexually harassing Jacqueline 
Chandler, another Firestone employee. Steese, a Fire-
stone personnel respresentative, and Ramsey, head of 
Firestone's Equal Employment Opportunity Department, 
conducted the investigation into Chandler's complaint of 
harassment, which led to Perry's dismissal. 
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Perry [*2] contends that the investigation into 
Chandler's charges was conducted in both an outrageous 
and negligent manner, because Steese and Ramsey failed 
to discover that Lamson did not engage in sexual har-
assment, but instead took part in a consensual, mutually 
flirtatious relationship" with Chandler. 
Immediately following his dismissal, Perry applied 
for unemployment benefits. The Ohio Bureau of Em-
ployment Services (OBES) denied his application after 
determining that Perry was dismissed for just cause. The 
decision of the OBES was upheld on appeal to the 
Wayne County Court of Common Pleas. Lamson v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co. (Aug. 20, 1987), Wayne C.P. 
No. 87-C1-038, unreported. Perry then filed a reverse 
sexual discrimination suit against Firestone in the United 
States District Court. Perry alleged that he and Chandler 
had engaged in a consensual, mutually flirtatious rela-
tionship, for which only he was fired and Chandler was 
not. The district court granted Firestone's motion for 
summary judgment, finding that Firestone had articulated 
a nondiscriminatory reason for Perry's dismissal, i.e. 
sexual harassment of chandler. Lamson v. Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co. (Dec. 15, [*3] 1987), U.S. Dist. Gt. No. 
C87-898A, unreported. The decision of the District Court 
was upheld on appeal to the United States Court of Ap-
peals, Sixth Circuit. Lamson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. (Nov. 4, 1988), C.A. 6 No. 88-3050, unreported. 
The Lamsons then brought the instant action in the 
Summit County Court of Common Pleas, asserting the 
following claims for relief: defamation, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, negligent investigation of 
Chandler's sexual harassment charges, and a claim for 
Annette's loss of Perry's services and consortium. On 
April 20, 1990, the appellees filed a motion for summary 
judgment as to all claims, which the trial court granted 
on June 29, 1990. 
The Lamsons appeal the trial court's ruling, and raise 
six assignments of error, all directed toward the propriety 
of the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
Assignment of Error VI 
"The court erred in placing the burden of proof in 
opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment on 
the plaintiffs-appellees (the nonmoving parties) rather 
than requiring the moving parties to show that no genu-
ine issue of material fact exists." 
Because the Lamsons' sixth assignment of error 
challenges [*4] the standard under which the trial court 
reviewed the appellees' motion for summary judgment, 
we will address this claimed error first. 
In its order granting summary judgment to the appel-
lees, the trial court noted that appellants "failed to prove 
genuine issues of material fact exist." Appellants seize 
upon this statement as proof that the trial court improp-
erly placed the burden of proof upon the nonmoving 
party. We disagree. 
[HN1] Pursuant to Civ. R. 56(C). a party's motion 
for summary judgment shall be granted if, construing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, 
"* * * the pleading, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of 
evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of 
fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. * * 
The burden of showing that no genuine issue of ma-
terial fact exists rests with the moving party. Harless v. 
Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 64, 
66. However, Civ. R. 56(E) provides that when a motion 
for summary judgment is made [*5] and supported by 
evidence as provided in the rule, the nonmoving party 
"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue^of fact for trial." 
The trial court found that the appellants' bare asser-
tions failed to adequately rebut the appellees' motion, as 
required by Civ. R. 56(E). It did not place the initial bur-
den upon appellants. 
Appellants' sixth assignment of error is overruled. 
Assignments of Error 
"I. The court erred in granting defendants' summary 
judgment [sic] on plaintiff Perry A. Lamson's .cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
"II. The court erred in granting defendants' summary 
judgment [sic] on plaintiff Perry A. Lamson's cause of 
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
"III. The court erred in granting defendants' sum-
mary judgment motion on plaintiff Perry A. Lamson's 
cause of action for defamation. 
"IV. The court erred in granting defendants' sum-
mary judgment motion on plaintiff Perry A. Lamson's 
cause of action for negligence. 
"V. The court erred in granting summary judgment 
on plaintiff Annette Lamson's cause of action for loss of 
services and consortium." 
Because appellants' remaining assignments [*6] of 
error all challenge the propriety of the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment, we will address them together. 
[HN2] In reviewing a summary judgment, both trial 
and appellate courts adopt the same standard. Both courts 
Page 3 
1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1010, * 
construe the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-
moving party. Toledo's Great Eastern Shoppers City, Inc. 
v. Abde's Black Angus Steak House No. Ill, Inc. (1986), 
24 Ohio St. 3d 198. 201-202. Pursuant to Civ. 56(C), a 
reviewing court will ailirm the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment if it finds that: 
"* * * 
"(1) No genuine issues as to any material fact re-
mains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the 
evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one con-
clusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in fa-
vor of the party against whom the motion for summary 
judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that 
party." 
»»* * * " 
Temple v. Wean United. Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St 2d 
317.327. 
As for his claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, the record, and most particularly the 
depositions of Perry, Steese, and Ramsey, fails to support 
Perry's bare assertions [*7] that the investigation of 
Chandler's charges of sexual harassment was conducted 
in such an outrageous manner as to go beyond all bounds 
of decency and become intolerable in a civilized com-
munity. See, Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6 Ohio 
St. 3d 369. 374-375. The trial court properly granted 
appellees summary judgment on this claim. 
As for Perry's claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, we note that this claim was neither pled in 
the complaint, nor addressed by the trial court. [HN3] 
This court need not address any issue which was not first 
raised in the trial court. Seelev v. Rahe (1985), 16 Ohio 
St. 25. 26. 
In his claim for defamation, Perry argues that Chan-
dler's allegedly defamatory statements were "published" 
by Chandler within the course of her employment when, 
prior to appellees' investigation, she told fellow employ-
ees of Perry's harassment. Appellant proceeded on a the-
ory of respondeat superior to hold Firestone liable for 
Chandler's statements. 
Perry's theory of recovery fails in two respects. First, 
[HN4] under respondeat superior, the test of Firestone's 
liability for Chandler's allegedly defamatory statements 
is not simply whether Chandler [*8] was in Firestone's 
employ, but whether the statements were made in the 
furtherance of Firestone's business and under the general 
direction of Firestone. See, Halkias v. Wilkoff Co. 
(1943), 141 Ohio St. 139. 152-153. Perry has failed to set 
forth specific facts showing that Chandler's statements to 
her co-workers were made in furtherance of Firestone's 
business. 
Second, the general rule [HN5] in Ohio is that an 
employer is not liable for an employee's intentional, ma-
licious torts performed outside the scope of employment 
Taylor v. Doctors Hospital (1985). 21 Ohio App. 3d 154. 
156. Perry failed to set forth specific facts demonstrating 
how Chandler's statements to co-workers regarding sex-
ual harassment by Perry fell within the scope of Chan-
dler's employment as a secretary. The trial court properly 
granted summary judgment to the appellees on this 
claim. 
In his fourth claim for relief, Perry urges this court 
to adopt the previously unrecognized tort of [HN6] neg-
ligent investigation of an employee's misconduct. We 
decline to do so. The trial court properly granted appel-
lees' summary judgment on this claim for the reason that 
no such cause of action exists in Ohio law. 
Finally, [*9] the trial court, having granted appel-
lees summary judgment on each of Perry's claims for 
relief, also granted appellees summary judgment on An-
nette's claims for loss of Perry's services and consortium. 
We find no error in this, as Annette's claim was deriva-
tive of Perry's. Messmore v. Monarch Machine Tool Co. 
(1983). 11 Ohio App. 3d 67. 68. As such, it would not 
exist but for Perry's, and cannot survive the dismissal of 
Perry's claims. Tomlinson v. Skolnik (1989). 44 Ohio 
St 3d 11. 14. 
Summary 
We overrule all of the appellants' assignments of er-
ror and affirm the trial court order granting appellees' 
motion for summary judgment in all respects. 
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds 
for this appeal. 
We order that a special mandate issue out of this 
court, directing the County of Summit Common Pleas 
Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified 
copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, 
pursuant to App. R. 27. 
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document 
shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall 
be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at 
which time the period for review shall begin to run. 
[*10] App. R. 22(E). 
Costs taxed to appellants. 
Exceptions. 
Page 4 
Pagel 
LEXSEE 1996 OHIO APP. LEXIS 510 
Positive 
As of: Jan 29, 2007 
REBECCA L. CORRADI, Plaintiff-Appellant -vs- EMMCO CORPORATION, ET 
AL», Defendants-Appellees 
NO. 67407 
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY 
1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 510 
February 15,1996, DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION 
NOTICE: [*1] THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS 
DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING 
RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION. 
PRIOR HISTORY: 
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal 
from Common Pleas Court. Case No. 224180. 
DISPOSITION: 
JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part, Reversed in part. 
COUNSEL: APPEARANCES: 
For Plaintiff-Appellant: MARC N. SILBERMAN, ESQ., 
24800 Chagrin Blvd., The Gundersen Bldg., Beachwood, 
Ohio 44122. 
For Defendants-Appellees: THOMAS H. BARNARD, 
ESQ., TIMOTHY J. DOWNING, ESQ., Ulmer & Berne, 
1300 East Ninth St., Suite 900, Cleveland, Ohio 44114. 
JUDGES: PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, 
PRESIDING JUDGE. PORTER, J., and McMONAGLE, 
J., CONCUR. 
OPINION BY: PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON 
OPINION: 
JOURNAL ENTRY and OPINION 
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, L: 
Plaintiff-appellant Rebecca L. Corradi appeals a di-
rected verdict in favor of defendants-appellees, Emmco 
Corporation and David Heffelman, and a jury verdict in 
favor of defendant-appellee, Irene Soltis. Corradi assigns 
the following errors for our review: 
I. THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL 
JUDGE DEMONSTRATED BIAS, 
PREJUDICE AND HOSTILITY 
TOWARDS APPELLANT THEREBY 
PREVENTING HER FROM OBTAINING 
A FAIR TRIAL. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE 
SUBSTANTIAL [*2] PREJUDICE OF 
APPELLANT EXCLUDING CERTAIN 
RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE WHICH PREVENTED HER 
FROM OBTAINING A FAIR TRIAL. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE 
SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF 
APPELLANT BY REFUSING TO 
PERMIT ONE OF HER KEY WITNESSES 
TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL AND BY 
SEVERELY LIMITING THE TESTIMONY 
OF ANOTHER PRIMARY WITNESS 
CALLED BY APPELLANT. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE 
SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF 
APPELLANT BY GRANTING A 
1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 510, * 
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DIRECTED VERDICT FOR APPELLEES 
AND SPECIFICALLY FOR APPELLEE, 
EMMCO CORPORATION. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE 
SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF 
APPELLANT BY REFUSING TO 
PERMIT HER TO FULLY AMEND HER 
COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED PURSUANT 
TO CIVR. 15(B). 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE 
SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF 
APPELLANT IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE JURY MISSTATING THE 
ELEMENTS OF DEFAMATION AND 
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON SLANDER PER SE. 
Having reviewed the record of the proceedings and 
the arguments presented by the parties, we affirm in part 
and reverse in part. The apposite facts follow. 
Rebecca Corradi was employed by EMMCO Corpo-
ration from November 21, 1988 to January 15, 1991. 
Emmco hired her as [*3J their business manager of their 
Columbus Park Apartments in Bedford Heights; later she 
became their property manager. As property manager, 
she was responsible for collecting and processing rent 
payments. Additionally, she was in charge of handling 
tenants' complaints and facilitating the repairs needed in 
the apartments. 
Her immediate supervisor was David Heffelman, 
Director of Residential Properties for EMMCO. In 1990, 
Corradi's relationship with HetTelman and her other su-
periors began to deteriorate. They complained because 
too much money was being spent on outside contractors 
for repairs that could have been done by in-house main-
tenance people. They complained particularly about the 
amount of work given to Danny Venturella as a plumb-
ing contractor. 
On January 15, 1991, Heffelman had a private meet-
ing with Corradi. In the meeting, he informed Corradi 
"EMMCO had decided to make a management change" 
and she should not take it personally. He then told her, 
"You can resign and have a letter of recommendation, or 
you can be terminated and take your chances." Corradi 
refused to resign. Upon leaving the office, Corradi told 
Mary Carpenter, she had just been fired. In a termination 
report [*4] form, Heffelman indicated the reason for her 
discharge was incompetence. 
When she arrived at her home she was told by her 
mother-in-law to call Irene Soltis. Irene Soltis was em-
ployed at the apartment building as office manager, and 
Corradi was her supervisor. When she called, Soltis was 
extremely upset, crying, and told Corradi, "I can't work 
there if you are not going to be there, what am I going to 
do?" Corradi talked to Soltis on one subsequent occasion 
to make arrangements to pick up her last paycheck, drop 
off petty cash, and money collected from rental of the 
complex party room. 
Barbara Van Hala, a part-time employee, told Cor-
radi that it was rumored that she was fired for receiving 
kickbacks from subcontractors, particularly Venturella. 
Corradi said several others knew of the rumor. Upon 
learning of the rumor she felt ashamed, angry, and hu-
miliated. 
Corradi's sisters-in-law, Sharon Banks and Beverly 
D'Ambrosia went to the rental office to visit Corradi. 
Banks was a tenant of Columbus Park Apartments at the 
time. Soltis informed Banks and D'Ambrosia that Cor-
radi was fired because she was taking money from petty 
cash. Soltis also told Melissa Brearey, who was a mutual 
friend [*5] of Soltis and Corradi, that Corradi was dis-
charged for removing carpeting and appliances from 
Columbus Park Apartments. 
Prior to Corradi's discharge, the management office 
of Columbus Park Apartments began receiving hang-up 
and threatening telephone calls. After Corradi was dis-
charged, Soltis went to the Bedford Heights Police De-
partment to report the harassing telephone calls. Soltis 
provided the police with Corradi's name as one of several 
possible suspects. The police contacted Corradi to dis-
cuss the allegations, but did not pursue an investigation. 
In March of 1991, Corradi applied for the position of 
credit collections manager with Associated Estates Re-
alty Corporation. She was referred to the company by her 
attorney and interviewed with the company's Comptrol-
ler, Regina Shaw. Shaw offered her the job, and she was 
to start Monday, the day after the interview. After the 
interview, she was sent to Associated's Human Re-
sources department to pick-up the necessary paper work. 
Corradi completed the paperwork and returned it. Nan 
Zielenic was director of Human Resources for Associ-
ated; it was her responsibility to check references of pro-
spective employees, but she had no independent [*6] 
recollection of doing so for Corradi. However, after Cor-
radi turned in her paperwork including her references, 
she received a telephone call from Shaw rescinding the 
job offer. 
Corradi filed an action for defamation and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress against EMMCO, 
Heffelman, and Soltis. After discovery, the case pro-
ceeded to a jury trial before Judge James P. Kilbane. At 
the close of the plaintiffs case, the trial court entered a 
directed verdict in favor of EMMCO and Heffelman. The 
claims against Soltis were submitted to the jury. In their 
1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 510, * 
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interrogatories the jury found Soltis made false state-
ments and published the statements, but the statements 
did not cause any injury to Corradi's reputation. The jury 
entered a verdict in favor of Soltis. Corradi moved for a 
new trial. While the motion was pending, Corradi filed a 
notice of appeal. The motion was denied for want of ju-
risdiction, and this appeal followed. 
Corradi's assignments of error will be addressed out 
of order in the interest of clarity. 
In her fourth assignment of error, Corradi asserts the 
trial court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of 
EMMCO and HeiTelman. Civ.R. 50(A)(4) provides when 
a [*7] motion for directed verdict has been properly 
made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence 
most strongly in favor of the party against whom the 
motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative 
issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion 
upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is ad-
verse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and 
direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue. See, 
also, Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc. 
(1992), 64 Ohio St. 3d 97, 109, 592 N.E.2d 828. An ac-
tion for defamation requires proof of "(1) an unprivileged 
communication; (2) false and defamatory language about 
another; and (3) requisite malice. A qualified privilege 
attaches to statements made within the scope of em-
ployment." Nichols v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. (June 23, 
1994), 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2697, Cuyahoga App. 
No. 65376, unreported. 
In her fourth assignment of error, Corradi makes 
several arguments. First, she argues the trial court erred 
in granting a directed verdict in favor of Heffelman. 
Mere allegations that rumors seem to reflect an em-
ployee's conversations with management are insufficient 
to establish management was responsible [*8] for publi-
cation of defamatory remarks. Turk v. Ohio Bell Tele-
phone Co. (Mar. 22, 1990), 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 
1072, Cuyahoga App. No. 56749, unreported. Rumors in 
and of themselves are not sufficient proof of a claim of 
defamation. Ashcroft v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center (1990), 
68 Ohio App. 3d 359, 588 N.E.2d 280. The spreading of 
rumors or gossip is only actionable as defamation to the 
extent that the statements made were attributable to the 
defendant. See Cooper v. Foster (Feb. 14, 1989), Frank-
lin App. No. 88 AP-326, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 567, 
unreported. In this case, there was no evidence Heffel-
man made any defamatory statements about Corradi or 
spread any rumors. Thus, the trial court properly directed 
a verdict in favor of Heffelman. 
Secondly, Corradi argues the trial court erred in 
granting a directed verdict in favor of EMMCO because 
is was liable for the defamatory statements made by 
Soltis. Where an employee commits an intentional tort, it 
must be calculated to facilitate or promote the business 
for which that person is employed. "The employer/ prin-
cipal is not liable for the independent, self-serving con-
duct of its employee/agent which does not so facilitate 
[*9] its business." Cooper v. Grace Baptist Church of 
Columbus, Ohio, Inc. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 728, 737, 
612 N.E.2d 357 (where giving personal opinion outside 
scope of employment in defamation action). 
In this case, Soltis was employed by EMMCO and 
assumed some of the responsibilities of Corradi after 
Corradi was discharged. Her responsibilities did not in-
clude providing information regarding the reasons for 
Corradfs discharge from EMMCO and there is no evi-
dence her remarks tended to "facilitate or promote" 
EMMCO's business. Id. Accordingly, Soltis was acting 
outside the scope of her employment, and therefore, the 
trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of 
EMMCO. 
In her first assignment of error, Corradi asserts she 
was denied a fair trial because the trial judge demon-
strated bias, prejudice, and hostility toward her. "A trial 
judge is presumed not to be biased or prejudiced, and the 
party alleging bias or prejudice must set forth evidence to 
overcome the presumption of integrity." State v. Wagner 
(1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 88, 93, 608 N.E.2d 852; citing 
State v. Richard (Dec. 5, 1991), 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 
5772, Cuyahoga App. No. 61524. The existence of 
prejudice [*10] or bias against a party is a matter that is 
peculiarly within the knowledge and reflection of each 
individual judge and is difficult to question unless the 
judge specifically verbalizes personal bias or prejudice 
toward a party. In re: Adoption of Reams (1989), 52 
Ohio App. 3d 52, 59, 557 N.E.2d 159. 
Corradi again advances several arguments in her 
first assignment of error. First, she argues the trial judge 
demonstrated open, blatant hostility and bias toward Wil-
liam Corradi. William Corradi is the husband of Rebecca 
Corradi and a special Cleveland Police Officer employed 
at Cleveland House of Corrections. During direct exami-
nation of William Corradi, when he was asked what shift 
he worked for the Cleveland Police Department, Judge 
James P. Kilbane interceded and said, "Wait. Since I was 
a policeman of the Cleveland Police Department, he is 
not a member of the Cleveland Police Department. I 
have got to protect them." Corradi argues the trial judge's 
comment was prejudicial. 
[A] trial judge has a duty to see that the truth is de-
veloped and should not hesitate to pose a proper, perti-
nent, and evenhanded question when justice requires." 
Akron-Canton Waste Oil, Inc. v. Safety-Kleen [*11] Oil 
Serv., Inc. (1992), 81 Ohio App. 3d 591, 610, 611 N.E.2d 
955. See, also, State v. Johnston (Dec. 15, 1993), 1993 
Ohio App. LEXIS 6139, Summit App. No. 16137. None-
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theless, a trial judge's participation by questioning or 
comment must be "scrupulously limited" to prevent the 
court from indicating to the jury, "consciously or uncon-
sciously," its opinion as to the credibility of the wit-
nesses. State, ex rel Wise, v. Chand (1970), 21 Ohio St. 
2d 113, 256 N.E.2d 613 at paragraph three of the sylla-
bus. If the intensity, tenor, range and persistence of the 
trial court's questions or comments can reasonably indi-
cate to the jury the court's opinion as to the credibility of 
the witness or the weight to be given to his testimony, 
the interrogation is prejudicially erroneous. Id. at para-
graph four of the syllabus. 
In this case, the comment of the trial judge evinces a 
strong feeling for the Cleveland Police Department. 
Nonetheless, the trial judge's intemperate comment does 
not in itself indicate bias, See Wagner at 94. Also, no 
other evidence exists that would tend to show prejudice 
against this witness. Albeit a minor point in this case, the 
clarification of the witness' [*12] occupation was a 
proper subject of comment. Thus, this court must con-
clude the jury was not prejudiced by the trial judge's 
comments. 
Corradi next argues the trial judge showed hostility 
and bias toward Regina Shaw as a plaintiffs witness. 
During the voir dire of Shaw outside the presence of the 
jury, the trial judge interrogated her as follows: 
THE COURT: I know you're a friend -
MS. SHAW: No, I'm not a friend, Your 
Honor. I don't even know them from 
Adam. I interviewed Rebecca Corradi one 
time. That's the only time I ever met the 
woman. 
THE COURT: I'm talking about with her 
attorney. 
MS. SHAW: I'm not friends with her at-
torney. I was talking to him about a 
statement. I'm not friends of anybody 
here. 
THE COURT: I don't imply that your tes-
timony is colored, but there is no testi-
mony that — 
MR. SILBERMAN: Ms. Shaw, could you 
tell the Court how I came to refer Ms. 
Corradi to you. 
THE COURT: I'm satisfied that you're an 
attorney, and that's why you referred her. 
But, on the matter of the voir dire, you 
can't establish anything [*13] in this par-
ticular case. I so rule. Call your next wit-
ness. Call the jury in. You're excused. 
The trial judge's questioning of whether Shaw was a 
friend of plaintiffs counsel was clearly a biased, im-
proper interrogation into the credibility of a witness. 
Nevertheless, the interrogation took place outside the 
presence of the jury; therefore, it was not prejudicial. The 
matter of whether Shaw should have been permitted to 
testify will be fully addressed in response to Corradi's 
third assignment of error. 
Corradi next argues the trial judge made derogatory 
comments reflecting upon the integrity of plaintiffs 
counsel by referring to him as "Thomas Shaughnessy." 
The four separate occasions during trial irr which the 
reference was made were as follows: 
Q: So this meeting was unusual? 
A: I thought -
MR. BARNARD: Objection. 
A: I thought it was very unusual. 
THE COURT: That's a comment. I will 
put you over there with Thomas Shaugh-
nessy. He's a great defense attorney. You 
can't — 
Q: If I understand your testimony, you 
had never - did you ask — 
THE COURT: This is Shaughnessy's 
stuff. You have asked the question. Ask 
him the question, not what [*14] you 
think he said. Please. 
MS. SHAW: I just feel like there's a lot of 
facts here that are not going to get out, 
'cause of the position — 
Q: I want to know what. 
MR. BARNARD: Objection. 
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THE COURT: He said he doesn't have 
any specific items. And again - can I call 
you Tom? 
MR. SILBERMAN: Your Honor, he just 
testified yes, but he doesn't ~ 
THE COURT: Well, I don't want to argue 
with you. Ask your next question. Even 
Shaughnessy knows enough to keep quiet 
after that. This is off the record. 
Q: And that one was not, was it? 
A: No. 
MR. BARNARD: Objection. Relevance. 
THE COURT: Sustained. It is - it is a 
comment, again, Mr. Shaughnessy. Par-
don me. Your name is Silberman. It is a 
comment on the evidence. Ignore it. 
MR. SILBERMAN: Thank you, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: You are welcome. 
The trial court's association of plaintiff s counsel was 
clearly inappropriate, but there is no evidence the trial 
judge harbored hostility or attempted to impugn the in-
tegrity of plaintiffs counsel. Therefore, these four re-
marks were not prejudicial. 
Corradi next argues the trial judge had ex parte 
communications with defense counsel. During the trial 
and outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge 
stated, Tve been approached by defense [*15] attorney 
that he has a motion to make, he wants to voir dire the 
next potential witness. Okay. You may. You want to call 
her in or argue? There's a voir dire?" Later in the course 
of the proceedings the trial judge stated, "We are in 
chambers, and I have been approached by the Plaintiffs 
attorney and - I mean the defense attorney, and he indi-
cates he wants to put something on the record as to an 
objection to certain types of witnesses." Corradi contends 
there were apparently ex parte communications and the 
resulting rulings denied her a fair trial. 
Canon 3(A)(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct pro-
vides: 
"A judge should accord to every person who is le-
gally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right 
to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized 
by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other 
communications concerning a pending or impending 
proceeding. * * * Nothing contained herein, however, 
shall preclude a judge from non-substantive ex parte 
communications on procedural matters and matters af-
fecting prompt disposal of the business of the court." 
It appears from the record in this case that defense 
counsel had ex parte communications [*16] with the 
trial judge on two occasions. It also, however, appears 
the content of those communications were involved in 
non-substantive matters. Merely asking a trial judge to 
entertain a motion or permit counsel to place an objec-
tion on the record in an ex parte conversation is not a 
violation of Canon 3(A)(4) of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct. Furthermore, the record clearly indicates defense 
counsel's motion and objection were fully and fairly re-
solved in the presence of plaintiffs counsel. Therefore, 
any ex parte conversations, did not deny Corradi a fair 
trial. See Bland v. Graves (1994), 99 Ohio App. 3d 123, 
136-138, 650 N.E.2d 117. 
Corradi next argues the trial judge reached conclu-
sions about the admissibility of certain evidence before 
the testimony was proffered thereby precluding her from 
obtaining a fair trial. A trial judge's opinions of law, even 
if erroneous, are not by themselves evidence of bias or 
prejudice. In re Disqualification of Murphy (1988), 36 
Ohio St. 3d 605, 522 N.E.2d 459. In this case, the trial 
judge's premature conclusions about certain evidence 
raises a question of the admissibility of the evidence, not 
one of alleged bias of the trial [*17] judge. The question 
of admissibility of the evidence will be addressed in re-
sponse to Corradi's second assignment of error. 
Corradi also argues the trial judge erred to the sub-
stantial prejudice of the defendant by instructing the jury 
to only consider certain witnesses. This argument is also 
one which raises a question of law, not of bias. This 
question will be addressed in response to Corradi's sixth 
assignment of error. 
Corradi next argues the cumulative effect of the trial 
judge's conduct prevented her from obtaining a fair trial. 
During the course of the voir dire of Rebecca Shaw out-
side the presence of the jury, plaintiffs counsel argued 
for admission of her testimony. The trial judge excluded 
the testimony and, on four separate occasions, he told 
plaintiffs counsel if he did not like the ruling, he could 
take it to the court of appeals. 
At one point, plaintiffs counsel stated, "Your Honor, 
if you will, at this point in time, you'll have to excuse my 
lack of experience as a trial lawyer, but I don't know ex-
acdy what to do. I understand what your ruling is going 
to be here. I disagree with the ruling. This is a critical 
witness for my case. I would ask for the right to [*18] 
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file a motion with the Court of Appeals now, 'cause I 
can't proceed further." 
After reviewing the trial judge's comments on the 
record during the voir dire, it is clear the trial judge ex-
hibited frustration with plaintiffs counsel, but those 
comments took place outside the presence of the jury, 
and could not have prejudiced Corradi's right to a fair 
trial. 
Corradi also argues the trial judge erred when it sus-
tained objections to plaintiffs counsel's questions during 
direct examination on several occasions where defense 
counsel had not posed an objection and the cumulative 
effect of the trial judge's actions were prejudicial. In each 
instance, the trial judge properly exercised his authority 
to intervene in order to provide for the orderly and expe-
ditious presentation of the evidence. See State v. Davis 
(1992), 79 Ohio App. 3d 450, 607 N.E.2d 543. Initially, 
opposing counsel made an objection to Corradi's counsel 
making comments rather than asking questions. Thereaf-
ter, in each instance the trial judge intervened to get Cor-
radi's counsel to ask a question of the witnesses rather 
than making a comment; the record does not reveal the 
trial judge displayed^ any bias or hostility [*19] during 
these objections. Accordingly, the cumulative effect of 
the conduct of the trial judge in this case did not deny 
Corradi a fair trial. 
In her second and third assignments of error, Corradi 
argues the trial court erred in excluding evidence which 
denied her a fair trial. "A trial court is vested with broad 
discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence in 
any particular case, so long as such discretion is exer-
cised in line with the rules of procedure and evidence." 
Rigby v. Lake Cty. (1991), 58 Ohio St. 3d 269, 271, 569 
N.E.2d 1056. Appellate review is limited to a determina-
tion of whether the lower court abused its discretion. E.g. 
Peters v. Ohio State Lottery Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St. 
3d 296, 299, 587 N.E.2d 290. The term "abuse of discre-
tion" connotes more than an error of law or judgment, it 
implies the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
unconscionable. E.g. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 
Ohio St. 3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140. 
Corradi argues the trial court erred in excluding evi-
dence of "rumors" as hearsay. Corradi asserts the evi-
dence of rumors was not hearsay within the meaning of 
Evid.R. 801(C). In the alternative, Corradi asserts [*20] 
the evidence of rumors constituted an admission by a 
party-opponent within the meaning of Evid.R. 
801(D)(2)(d), and therefore, was not hearsay. Corradi 
also asserts the rumors were exceptions to the hearsay 
rule under Evid.R. 803(1), (3), and (20). 
"Hearsay" is an out-of-court statement offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Evid.R. 801(C). 
Where an out-of-court statement is offered without refer-
ence to its truth, it is not hearsay. State v. Price (1992), 
80 Ohio App. 3d 108, 608 N.E.2d 1088. "A statement is 
not hearsay if it is admitted to prove that the declarant 
made it, rather than to prove the truth of its contents." 
State v. Williams (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 346, 528 N.E.2d 
910. "Words constituting conduct are not hearsay, e.g., 
words of a contract, libel, slander, threats and the like." 
Evid.R. 801(C), Staff Note. 
In this case, Corradi presents the testimony of nu-
merous witnesses to prove there were "rumors" circulat-
ing among the employees of EMMCO about the reasons 
for her dismissal. This testimony was not used to prove 
the truth of the contents of the statements, but simply to 
demonstrate that the statements were made. Therefore, 
the evidence of rumors [*21] was not hearsay within the 
meaning of Evid.R. 801(C). Having found the evidence 
of rumors not to be hearsay within the meaning of 
Evid.R. 801(C), Corradi's alternative arguments under 
Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(d) and 803(1), (3), and (20) are moot. 
Although the rumors in this case were not hearsay 
and were admissible, the rumors were not attributed to 
any of the defendants. Absent some evidence the rumors 
were attributable to or caused by the defendants, they are 
not actionable. See Turk and Cooper v. Foster, supra. 
While it is clear certain rumors were circulated by Soltis, 
it is not clear she was the source of the rumors Corradi 
sought to introduce into evidence through the testimony 
of EMMCO employees. Because Corradi failed to estab-
lish how the rumors related to the slanderous statements 
made by Soltis, we find the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding them as evidence. 
Corradi also argues the trial court erred in the exclu-
sion of the testimony about the nature of a conversation 
she had with Sergeant William Schultz of the Bedford 
Heights Police Department. Having reviewed the tran-
script and the manner in which these questions were 
asked, it is clear Corradi was [*22] not attempting to 
elicit hearsay testimony. However, Evi&R. 103(A)(2) 
requires a party to proffer the substance of excluded evi-
dence unless the substance of that evidence is apparent. 
The failure to proffer that excluded evidence waives any 
error. See State v. Brooks (1989), 44 Ohio St. 3d 185, 
542 N.E.2d 636. In this case, Corradi failed to proffer the 
substance of her conversation with Schultz and its rele-
vance to this case is not apparent. Accordingly, any error 
in excluding that testimony was waived. 
Corradi also argues the trial court improperly ex-
cluded the testimony of Regina Shaw as hearsay. Shaw 
would have testified that she was prepared to hire Cor-
radi for a job with Associated Estates Realty Company, 
but decided not to hire Corradi on the basis of an unfa-
vorable recommendation from EMMCO. While another 
person contacted EMMCO for Shaw, Shaw's testimony 
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was not offered for its truth. See Price, supra. Shaw's 
testimony was offered to prove Corradi received an un-
favorable recommendation from EMMCO and as such, 
represented evidence of conduct which is not hearsay. 
See Evid.R. 801(C). Accordingly, we find the trial judge 
improperly excluded the testimony of Regina Shaw. 
[*23] 
Nonetheless, an unfavorable recommendation made 
in good faith was a privileged communication. A com-
munication by an employer as to the reasons for the dis-
charge of a former employee to the former employee's 
prospective employer is protected by a qualified privi-
lege. Rinehart v. Maiorano (1991), 76 Ohio App. 3d 413, 
421, 602 N.E.2d 340. "Only where the statements are 
made maliciously is the privilege destroyed." Id. In this 
case, Corradi did not present any evidence as to who 
conveyed the unfavorable recommendation on behalf of 
EMMCO, or as to its content or the substance of the rec-
ommendation. Absent some evidence that the communi-
cation was malicious, this court must presume it was 
privileged. Although the trial court clearly erred in ex-
cluding the testimony of Rebecca Shaw, we find no 
abuse of discretion because 4he communication was pro-
tected by a qualified privilege. 
Corradi also argues the trial court erred by refusing 
to permit her counsel to cross-examine witnesses identi-
fied with the defendant company EMMCO. Allowing or 
refusing to allow leading questions in the examination of 
a witness is subject to the control of the court, and absent 
an abuse of discretion, the [*24] trial court's decision 
should not be disturbed. Ramage v. Central Ohio Emer-
gency Serv., Inc. (1992), 64 Ohio St. 3d 97, 111, 592 
N.E.2d 828. Evid.R. 611(C) provides: "***When a party 
calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness 
identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by 
leading questions." Where a witness is identified with an 
adverse party but is not hostile, it is not an abuse of dis-
cretion for the trial court refuse to allow the use of lead-
ing questions. See Ramage, supra. 
In the case, counsel for Corradi called several em-
ployees of EMMCO on direct examination, but the trial 
did not permit him to ask them leading questions. To the 
extent that they were employed by the defendant com-
pany, EMMCO, they were identified with an adverse 
party within the meaning of Evid.R. 611(C). Nonethe-
less, there was no evidence during direct examination 
that they exhibited hostility toward Corradi. Therefore, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
In her fifth assignment of error, Corradi argues the 
trial erred by refusing to permit her to amend her com-
plaint. Civ.R 15(B) provides: "When issues not raised 
by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent 
[*25] of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects 
as if they had been raised in the pleadings.***" "Under 
Civ.R. 15(B), implied consent is not established merely 
because evidence bearing directly on an impleaded issue 
was introduced without objection; it must appear that the 
parties understood the evidence was aimed at the im-
pleaded issue. " State, ex rel Evans, v. Bainbridge Twp. 
Trustees (1983), 5 Ohio St. 3d 41, 448 N.E.2d 1159 at 
paragraph two of the syllabus. "Whether an impleaded 
issue is tried by implied consent is to be determined by 
the trial court, whose finding will not be disturbed, ab-
sent showing of an abuse of discretion." Id. at paragraph 
three of the syllabus. 
In this case, counsel for Corradi moved to amend the 
complaint to include the torts of invasion of privacy and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress immediately 
prior to resting the plaintiffs case. The trial judge denied 
the motion. A careful review of the record does not re-
veal any discussion or testimony during the trial that 
would suggest the parties understood the evidence to be 
aimed at the unpleaded issues of invasion of privacy or 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, 
[*26] the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing Corradi's motion to amend the pleadings under 
Civ.R. 15(B). 
In her sixth assignment of error, Corradi argues the 
trial court erred in its instructions to the jury by misstat-
ing the elements of defamation and by refusing to in-
struct the jury on slander per se. Requested jury instruc-
tions should be given if they are correct statements of the 
law applicable to the facts in the case and reasonable 
minds might reach the conclusion sought by the instruc-
tion. Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg. Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St. 
3d 585, 591, 575 N.E.2d 828. "In reviewing a record to 
ascertain the presence of sufficient evidence to support 
the giving of an instruction, an appellate court should 
determine whether the record contains evidence from 
which reasonable minds might reach the conclusion 
sought by the instruction." Id., quoting Feterle v. Huett-
ner (1971), 28 Ohio St 2d 54, 275 N.E.2d 340 at the 
syllabus. 
The question of whether a statement is slander per se 
is an issue of law for the trial court to decide. Matalka v. 
Lagemann (1985), 21 Ohio App. 3d 134, 136, 486 
N.E.2d 1220. "Slander per se means that the slander is 
accomplished [*27] by the very words spoken. w 
McCartney v. Oblates of St. Francis deSales (1992), 80 
Ohio App. 3d 345, 353, 609 N.E.2d 216. "In order for an 
oral defamatory remark to be considered slander per se it 
must consist of words which import an indictable crimi-
nal offense involving moral turpitude or infamous pun-
ishment, imputes some loathsome or contagious disease 
which excludes one from society or tends to injure one in 
his trade or occupation." Id. 
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In this case, Soltis told two people that Corradi was 
discharged for taking money from the petty cash fund, 
and told another person that Corradi was discharged for 
removing carpeting and appliances from the apartments 
she managed. In both instances, Soltis suggested Corradi 
had committed theft offenses which were indictable of-
fenses involving moral1 turpitude, and tended to injure 
reputation in her occupation. Thus, as a matter of law, 
the statements allegedly made by Soltis were slander per 
se, and the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury 
on slander per se. Accordingly, this case is reversed and 
remanded for a new trial against Irene Soltis. 
Corradi also argues the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury on the [*28] issue of nominal damages. 
In an action for slander per se compensatory damages 
will be presumed. King v. Bogner (1993), 88 Ohio App. 
3d 564, 567, 624 N.E.2d 364. Because this action in-
volves slander per se and damages are presumed, the 
question of whether Corradi was entitled to a jury in-
struction on nominal damages is moot. 
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
This cause is affirmed in part, and reversed in part. 
It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the 
costs herein taxed. 
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for 
this appeal. 
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this 
Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this 
judgment into execution. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the 
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
PORTER, J., and 
McMONAGLE, J. CONCUR. 
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON 
PRESIDING JUDGE 
N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of 
Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is 
an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) 
days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped 
to indicate journalization, at which time it [*29] will 
become the judgment and order of the Court and time 
period for review will begin to run. 
